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CROOKED POLITICIANS: ELUSIVE 
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENTS AND PATHS TO 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Pedro Gerson*
          In the past decade there have been numerous failed prosecutions 
of high-profile corruption cases. This record is problematic because it 
risks public institutions’ legitimacy, potentially increasing corruption. 
The Supreme Court has borne much of the blame for this situation due to 
its decisions narrowing the construction of anti-corruption criminal 
statutes. Many have criticized the Court for having a myopic view of 
governance and allowing a misplaced fear of a democratic chilling effect 
get in the way of accountability. Others have called for substantive 
and/or procedural criminal law reform to enable law-enforcement 
authorities to secure convictions in cases of public wrongdoing. In this 
article, I argue that the Supreme Court’s anti-corruption jurisprudence 
is not rooted in notions of democracy but in criminal law. In mostly 
unanimous decisions, the Court has repeatedly struck down or narrowed 
statutes relying on traditional doctrines of criminal law interpretation. 
Unanimity suggests that more than politics, the Court is doing law. I then 
suggest that contrary to public perceptions, data from the Department of 
Justice and an analysis of lower court decisions shows that corruption 
prosecutions are not in dire straits. Taking this conclusion and looking 
to international best-practices, I argue that rather than focusing on 
criminal law, reformers should look to preserve and promote impartial 
governance through administrative laws and institutions. I also suggest 
that the United States could follow other countries in implementing more 
robust administrative sanctions to ensure accountability in acts of public 
malfeasance that do not rise to the level of criminal offenses.  
 
 * Many thanks to Clare Ryan, Benjamin Levin, Jacob Eisler, Tom Ginsburg, Anthony 
Casey, Camila Vergara, and Bob Lancaster, for all their helpful comments and critiques. As hard 
as they tried to avoid it, all errors are mine, of course. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 1, 2015, the Department of Justice presented a sixty-
eight page, twenty-two-count indictment against Senator Robert 
Menendez and his friend and associate Salomon Melgen.1 The 
indictment tells a fairly scandalous story of public corruption.2 In 
essence, the Government alleged that Melgen bribed Menendez with, 
among other things, “domestic and international flights on private jets, 
first-class domestic airfare, use of a Caribbean villa, access to an 
exclusive Dominican resort, a stay at a luxury hotel in Paris, expensive 
meals, golf outings,” and political donations in the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in between the years of 2006 and 2013.3 In 
exchange, the indictment alleged, Menendez used his office to 
influence U.S. immigration officials to allow Mr. Melgen to bring his 
“foreign girlfriends”; to pressure the U.S. Department of State to 
interfere on behalf of Mr. Melgen’s businesses in the Dominican 
Republic; to stop the U.S. Customs and Border Protection from 
donating surveillance equipment to the Dominican Republic because 
it would affect Mr. Melgen’s business interests on the island; and to 
“influence the outcome of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services’s [sic] (CMS’s) administrative action seeking millions of 
dollars in Medicare overbillings that [Mr. Melgen] owed.”4 
The case was a media bombshell.5 It was not only that the case 
involved details seemingly made for tabloids: a then 60-year-old 
millionaire paying a United States senator to assist him in bringing to 
the United States his foreign-born girlfriends who were models in their 
20s.6 It was also that the Department of Justice presented what seemed 
 
 1. Indictment at 1, United States v. Menendez, 270 F. Supp. 3d 780 (D.N.J. 2017) (No. 15-
cr-155), 2015 WL 1457957. 
 2. Given that instances of high-level public corruption in the U.S. are relatively rare, this case 
was very shocking nationally; to international observers of corruption, however, the particular 
allegations in the case against Senator Menendez and Mr. Melgen are not out of the ordinary. 
 3. Indictment, supra note 1, at 2–4. 
 4. Id. at 6. 
 5. See, e.g., Alexandra Jaffee, Menendez Indictment: 3 Girlfriends, 7 Lavish Trips, More 
Than $750,000, CNN (Apr. 3, 2015, 8:55 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/02/politics/menen
dez-indictment-takeaways/index.html; Isabel Vincent & Melissa Klein, How Menendez 
‘Conspired’ to Import Rich Donor’s Babes, N.Y. POST (Apr. 18, 2015, 10:01 PM), 
https://nypost.com/2015/04/18/how-menendez-conspired-to-import-rich-donors-babes/; David 
Freedlander, Robert Menendez Is Testing New Jersey’s Tolerance for Sleaze, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 2, 
2018), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/robert-menendez-is-testing-new-jerseys-tolerance 
-for-sleaze.html. 
 6. See Vincent & Klein, supra note 5. 
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to be damning evidence that showed how the bribery conspiracy took 
place. The indictment, for example, included very specific details such 
as the fact that Mr. Melgen had given Senator Menendez 649,611 
American Express Membership Rewards points to pay for a hotel suite 
in Paris7 and detailed e-mail exchanges showing Senator Menendez’s 
staff intervening with the State Department and Customs and Border 
Patrol in favor of Mr. Melgen.8 
All of the evidence presented by the Department of Justice made 
it seem that the case was a sure win for the Government. There was 
enough of a paper trail detailing both the payments and gifts in kind 
made to Senator Menendez, and of the various governmental actions 
that the Senator took to help Mr. Melgen’s business interests. 
However, after a months-long trial and two days of jury deliberations, 
on November 16, 2017, the case against Senator Menendez and Mr. 
Melgen ended in a mistrial.9 The following year the Justice 
Department decided not to re-try the case and dismissed all the 
charges.10 Later that year Senator Menendez was re-elected to the 
Senate.11 
Many commentators attributed12 the mistrial on a Supreme Court 
decision that came out in the years between the indictment and the 
 
 7. Indictment, supra note 1, at 10. 
 8. Id. at 19, 33. 
 9. Amber Phillips, Everything You Need to Know About Sen. Robert Menendez’s Corruption 
Saga, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Apr. 26, 2018, 2:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/t
he-fix/wp/2017/09/05/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sen-bob-menendezs-corruption-trial/; 
see Laura Jarrett & Sarah Jorgensen, Bob Menendez Trial Ends in Mistrial After Jury Deadlocks, 
CNN (Nov. 16, 2017, 3:31 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/16/politics/bob-menendez-
trial/index.html. 
 10. Phillips, supra note 9. 
 11. Ella Nilsen, Sen. Bob Menendez Wins Reelection in New Jersey, VOX (Nov. 7, 2018, 
1:12 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/6/18050622/new-jersey-election-results-bob-menendez-
winner. Prior to the case against Sen. Menendez and Mr. Melgen ending in a mistrial, Mr. Melgen 
was convicted of various crimes related to Medicare fraud in the amount of $73 million dollars. See 
David J. Neal, Eye Doctor Is Sentenced in $73 Million Medicare Fraud, MIA. HERALD (Feb. 22, 
2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article201585704.html. He was 
sentenced to seventeen years in prison. Id. The allegations in that case were unrelated to his trial 
with Sen. Menendez. Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Alan Maimon & Devlin Barrett, After Mistrial, Menendez Speaks of 
‘Resurrection,’ but Joy May Be Short-Lived, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/menendez-jury-says-again-that-it-is-
deadlocked/2017/11/16/c6ae9096-c951-11e7-aa96-54417592cf72_story.html (where Kelly 
Kramer, a white-collar defense attorney stated that “[t]his is the first major post-McDonnell trial, 
and it does suggest that public corruption offenses are going to be much tougher to prove”); see 
also Alan Feuer, Why Are Corruption Cases Crumbling? Some Blame the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
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trial: McDonnell v. United States.13 In that case, former Virginia 
Governor Robert McDonnell and his wife, Maureen McDonnell, were 
indicted by the Federal Government on honest services fraud and 
Hobbs Act extortion after they accepted $175,000 in loans, vacations, 
and gifts (like a Rolex and a $20,000 shopping spree) from Jonnie 
Williams, a businessman.14 In return, Mr. and Mrs. McDonnell hosted 
an event at the governor’s mansion to promote a product produced by 
Mr. Williams, a supplement called Anatabloc, and encouraged public 
universities to do research on the product.15 
As explored more fully in Part II, in McDonnell the Supreme 
Court narrowed the meaning of “official act” as used in the bribery 
statute.16 The Court held that an “official act” “must involve a formal 
exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit 
before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before 
a committee.”17 In sum, the Court held that all the other ways a public 
official may influence a particular outcome, as long as they are not 
“official acts,” are not subject to criminal liability under the federal 
bribery statute.18 
McDonnell cast a shadow on the Government’s case against Sen. 
Menendez and Mr. Melgen. Reading the indictment of that case, 
knowing the outcome of McDonnell, it is easy to see why the Justice 
Department was not able to convince a jury that Sen. Menendez was 
guilty of bribery. In the end, the 68-page indictment did not include 
any formal governmental action from Sen. Menendez or his office in 
favor of Mr. Melgen. He called public officials, held meetings with 
them, sent emails, yes, but none of those communications were of a 
different nature than the thousands of others sent in favor of 
legislator’s constituents.19 They were not, in sum, “official acts,” so 
Sen. Menendez could not be convicted of the crime of bribery. 
 
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/nyregion/menendez-seabrook-
corruption-cases-crumbling-.html (arguing that the Supreme Court’s narrowing of criminal 
corruption statutes made cases like Senator Menendez’s difficult to prosecute). 
 13. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
 14. Id. at 2361–63. 
 15. See id. at 2363. 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2018). 
 17. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371–72. 
 18. Id. 
 19. I am not arguing that there is not a moral difference between a legislator intervening 
forcefully in favor of an individual who is not a constituent and has given a public official money 
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The trajectory of the case against Sen. Menendez and Mr. Melgen 
is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s narrow readings 
of anti-corruption criminal statutes throughout the last twenty years. 
In that time period, the United States Supreme Court has looked at 
four cases of criminal corruption.20 All four decisions have in some 
way circumscribed criminal anti-corruption statutes to very specific 
conduct. Furthermore, in all four cases, the Court has unanimously 
held in favor of the defendants. This has led to a flurry of criticism 
against the Court.21 Some have argued that the Court is far too 
preoccupied with chilling contacts between constituents and 
politicians and has thereby erred far too much on the side of tolerating 
conduct that it should not.22 As Lynn Adelman, a U.S. District Court 
judge in Wisconsin, said, “the court’s concerns about inhibiting 
interactions between constituents and officials are enormously 
overblown.”23 Others have argued that the Court’s reasoning in several 
of these cases is indicative of the Justices’ obtuseness with regards to 
the political process.24 Finally, some scholars have argued that the 
Court’s views emanate from the justices political philosophy that is 
exclusively preoccupied with “the protection of individual rights over 
government intrusion,” which has led to an interpretation of the 
 
and gifts, and a legislator similarly interfering for a constituent who has not given her anything. 
The argument is that Sen. Menendez did not interfere in a different way than he would have in a 
less morally compromising situation. That is, my claim here is descriptive, not normative. 
 20. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020); McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2355 (2016); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999); Skilling v. 
United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). As mentioned in infra note 105, Skilling is a private corruption 
case that was decided with a companion public corruption case. Its impact on public corruption is 
therefore clear. 
 21. See, e.g., Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Deregulating Corruption, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
471, 484 (2019) (arguing that the Roberts Court has been invested in narrowing the grounds for 
criminal and campaign finance corruption); Leah Litman, Prosecuting Political Corruption Cases 
Like Bridgegate Is Nearly Impossible, WASH. POST (May 8, 2020, 12:32 PM), https://www.washi
ngtonpost.com/outlook/prosecuting-political-corruption-cases-like-bridgegate-is-nearly-impossibl 
e/2020/05/08/bb6f4828-912d-11ea-a9c0-73b93422d691_story.html; Ian Millhiser, The Supreme 
Court’s “Bridgegate” Decision Leaves a Big Hole in America’s Anti-Corruption Laws, VOX 
(May 7, 2020, 12:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/5/7/21250580/supreme-court-bridgegate-
us-kelly-chris-christie-corruption-new-jersey. 
 22. See Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken Institutional Battle Over Anticorruption: Citizens United, 
Honest Services, and the Legislative-Judicial Divide, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363, 365 (2011). 
 23. Lynn Adelman, The Supreme Court and the Corruption of Democracy, 38 RARITAN 9, 9 
(2019). 
 24. Matthew Stephenson, The Supreme Court’s McDonnell Opinion: A Post-Mortem, THE 
GLOB. ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (July 19, 2016), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/07/19 
/the-supreme-courts-mcdonnell-opinion-a-post-mortem/. 
(6) 54.4_GERSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/21  8:16 PM 
2021] CROOKED POLITICIANS 1019 
anticorruption regime as one that only “penalizes undesirable behavior 
through narrowly delineated rules.”25 
A more generous and, in my view, more plausible interpretation 
is that in these cases the Supreme Court is not analyzing statutes as 
anti-corruption criminal statutes specifically, but as criminal statutes 
generally. All of the Supreme Court criminal corruption decisions of 
the last thirty years have been decided unanimously and turned on 
basic doctrines of criminal law interpretation designed to protect 
defendants from a potentially overreaching State.26 In the most recent 
decision, Kelly v. United States,27 for example, the Court reversed a 
conviction of wire fraud and fraud on a federally funded program or 
entity28 against two public officials.29 Those crimes prohibit the use of 
fraudulent schemes to “obtain[] money or property.”30 In that case, the 
Federal Government prosecuted public officials of the Port Authority 
of New York and New Jersey for closing two traffic lanes in Fort Lee, 
New Jersey, in retaliation for Fort Lee’s mayor’s refusal for 
supporting then New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s re-election 
campaign.31 The Court found that the Port Authority public officials 
had not schemed to obtain property or money.32 Rather, they had 
schemed for “political payback.”33 Therefore, no crime had been 
committed. As Justice Kagan argued, the officials had acted in bad 
 
 25. Eisler, supra note 22, at 367. 
 26. This is different to the argument made by Eisler, supra note 22, in the sense that he views 
these outcomes as a product of a political philosophy or convictions about democracy, while I view 
it as an outcome based on commitments to how a particular body of law should be interested. Given 
the ideological difference among members of the Court, and therefore their diverse political 
philosophies, it is hard to see how the outcomes in these cases can be motivated exclusively by 
philosophical commitments when they have all been decided unanimously. It could very well be 
that some justices were motivated by ideological commitments, this is especially true of those, like 
Justices Thomas and Alito, that do not traditionally vote in favor of defendants. It could be that 
these Justices, as Eisler suggests, are acting in defense of their class, and simply voted in a 
unanimous court rationalizing the argument differently as a way to vote strategically in the long 
run. However, given that not all justices have shown similar proclivities to rule in favor of 
politicians or moneyed interests suggests that ideology is not driving these decisions. 
 27. 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020). 
 28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)(1)(A), 1343 (2018). 
 29. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1568–69. 
 30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)(1)(A), 1343, (similarly prohibiting the use of fraudulent schemes to 
“obtain[] money or property”). 
 31. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1569–71. 
 32. Id. at 1574. 
 33. Id. 
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faith and corruptly, but “not every corrupt act by state or local officials 
is a federal crime.”34 
Kelly v. United States was a fairly straight forward case about 
statutory interpretation. The statutes at issue do not criminalize 
corruption generally, but rather the use of fraud to obtain property.35 
The Supreme Court engaged in traditional analysis of the elements of 
a particular criminal statute and identified that one of those elements 
is that the accused gains money or property from the victim.36 This 
element was not met, so the convictions were reversed.37 As explored 
in Part II, Kelly v. United States is probably the most clear-cut case out 
of the most recent criminal anti-corruption Supreme Court decisions.38 
Nonetheless, it showcases that in these decisions the Court is not 
executing some naïve analysis, but rather carrying out formal 
interpretations of criminal statutes. 
I do not mean to argue that the way the Supreme Court has 
interpretated anti-corruption criminal statutes is the only plausible 
reading of those laws. In McDonnell, the Court could have read the 
term “official act” in such a way that would have sustained the 
conviction against Governor McDonnell but avoided some of the 
Court’s preoccupations about vague statutes or overzealous 
prosecutors. My argument here is not that the Court has always been 
right, but rather that the decisions reflect a criminal legal jurisprudence 
that is grounded on various principles of criminal law that exist to 
protect individuals from unjust prosecution.39 Specifically, the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in these cases can be interpreted as 
extensions of rules that express the fact that criminal law must be 
especially attentive to fair-warning, determinacy, and due process, 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. These statutes are more a response to officials using their power to embezzle government 
funds or services and/or to extort citizens from their property, than to the abuse of power generally. 
They are, in other words, criminalizing the abuse of power for personal (pecuniary) gain. This is a 
play on the most common definition of corruption, Transparency International’s: “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain.” See What Is Corruption?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 36. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1571. 
 37. Id. at 1572, 1574. 
 38. See id. at 1571–74. 
 39. We may believe that this grounding is politically motivated or that it gets special attention 
in anti-corruption cases only, that is a separate question. Infra Part I addresses the objections to the 
idea that the criminal law is actually constrained by these principles. 
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such as the principle of legality,40 the void-for-vagueness doctrine,41 
and the rule of lenity.42 
Many scholars have observed the various ways in which “these 
various principles are unfulfilled aspirations rather than actual 
constraints on the state’s power to impose criminal sanctions.”43 This 
unfulfillment raises valid questions as to whether or not the U.S. 
Supreme Court feels actually limited by the procedural 
protections/doctrines of interpretation just outlined. First, certain 
Justices44 that voted in favor of defendants in anti-corruption cases 
have a strong track record of not usually heeding to these 
considerations. More importantly, the Court has, doctrinally speaking, 
rubberstamped the constitutionality of most enforcement of criminal 
law even in circumstances that clearly evidence constitutional 
 
 40. Although there are many interpretations of the principle of legality (nullem crimen sine 
lege), there are at least two rules that seem to underline the principle: only the law can define a 
crime and prescribe a penalty, and retrospective criminal laws are precluded. For differing views 
of the principle see, e.g., Cian C. Murphy, The Principle of Legality in Criminal Law Under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 192 passim (2010) (arguing 
that the European Court of Human Rights has also incorporated a prohibition on harsher penalties 
than those proscribed in law in its interpretation of the legality principle); see also Peter K. Westen, 
Two Rules of Legality in Criminal Law, 26 LAW & PHIL. 229, 303 passim (2007) (arguing that the 
principle of legality could be redefined as “[n]o person shall be punished in the absence of a bad 
mind” and “[e]very person is presumed innocent until proven guilty”). 
 41. Prohibiting laws that either (1) fail to give “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of 
what is prohibited” (the “fair notice” prong), or (2) is “so standardless that it authorizes or 
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement” (the “arbitrary enforcement” prong). Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (citations omitted). 
Many observers have pointed out that the Supreme Court has not applied this doctrine uniformly. 
See, e.g., John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American 
Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 241, 243 (2002) (paraphrasing Justice Stewart’s famous “I 
know it when I see it” standard to describe the doctrine). 
 42. This doctrine articulates an old maxim from Roman Law: in dubio pro reo, which states 
that ambiguous criminal statutes will be interpreted in favor of the defendant. AARON X. FELLMETH 
& MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INT’L L. 126 (2009). There are several critiques of this 
doctrine as well. Some have argued that the Rule of Lenity “appears occasionally as a supplemental 
justification for interpretations favored on other grounds; it never stands alone to compel narrow 
readings.” Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 886 
(2004). For a different view, see, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO 
INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008) (explaining that the rule of lenity is used to favor 
defendants to balance their lack of power vis-à-vis the government). 
 43. Alice Ristroph, The Curriculum of the Carceral State, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1631, 1657 
(2020). 
 44. Justices Thomas and Alito, for example, routinely hold against defendants in cases 
involving criminal law. 
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violations.45 It is therefore fair to ask why the Court is so willing to 
enforce the state’s constitutional obligations when defendants are 
powerful, but not otherwise. However, why judges are deciding anti-
corruption criminal cases differently than other criminal cases is 
beyond the scope of this paper.46 
Rather than engaging in a critical or realist exploration of the 
motivations behind the Justices’ decision-making, I try to understand 
the decisions doctrinally. Looking at them through this lens, it 
becomes clear that the outcomes in these cases are the result of 
reasonable conclusions of foundational47 principles of criminal law 
and process. I am not arguing that the Court itself always protects 
defendants,48 but it is not surprising that the Supreme Court does so in 
high profile cases. This is consistent with what Alexandra Natapoff 
has labeled the penal pyramid: “in which the law itself functions very 
differently at the elite top than it does at the sprawling bottom.”49 To 
the extent, therefore, that one wants to engage with a critical 
exploration of the Court’s decision-making, Natapoff’s argument 
serves against the knee-jerk reaction that anti-corruption jurisprudence 
is only driven by Justices’ self-interest. 
Many observers have been uncomfortable with the Supreme 
Court, perhaps uncritically, applying these principles to these cases 
because these doctrines serve, in theory, to address a power 
asymmetry between individuals and the State. However, in public 
 
 45. Sharon Dolovich, Canons of Evasion in Constitutional Criminal Law, in THE NEW 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 111, 112 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) 
(arguing that through “three basic doctrinal moves . . . deference, presumption, and substitute 
question,” the Supreme Court has created a mechanism through which lower courts can evade 
constitutional protections to validate state action). 
 46. There is a growing body of work showing and debating the extent that Supreme Court 
outcomes are ideologically motivated. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES 
MAKE 22–25 (1998) (showing that ideology is a powerful predictor for judicial outcomes); LEE 
EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
RATIONAL CHOICE (2013) (applying a labor-market theory of behavior to understand judicial 
decision-making, which fares better in explaining judicial decisions across all of the judiciary than 
standard attitudinal or strategic-choice models). 
 47. Ristroph, supra note 43 (showing the extent to which criminal pedagogy is structured on 
a belief that the principle of legality and other limiting principles actually do constrain the 
enforcement of criminal law, despite all the evidence to the contrary). 
 48. See, e.g., Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Vagueness as Impossibility, 98 TEX. L. REV. 
1049, 1049 (2020) (arguing that the Supreme Court has inconsistently applied the void-for-
vagueness doctrine and that to better understand these decisions vagueness should be understood 
as impossibility to comply with the law). 
 49. Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 71, 
72 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017). 
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corruption cases this asymmetry is vanished, because on trial are 
individuals “privileged through access to governmental resources 
[abusing] their unique power.”50 It is not only that the defendants are 
sophisticated and informed, and can thus ex-ante develop schemes to 
avoid prosecution,51 but that because of their position in government 
(or their closeness to government officials in the case of private actors) 
they are singularly situated to influence the prosecution in their favor. 
Protection for the defendants in these cases thus seems like a 
perpetuation of fundamental inequities in criminal law enforcement 
where wealthy and influential defendants skirt the law through 
legalese. While there is no doubt that this is a dynamic of criminal law 
in the United States, it is doubtful that the normative reaction to this 
problem is to eschew doctrinal and jurisprudential protections for 
powerful defendants, rather than demand that they be equally enforced 
for all. 
The question about how to respond to these rulings is complicated 
by the fact that what we mean by corruption is easily muddled.52 The 
most widely used definition of corruption is Transparency 
International’s (TI): “abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”53 
This definition is unsatisfactory because it ignores private conduct that 
can be corrupt.54 Furthermore, it is not always clarifying; for example, 
are instances where a former public official leverages his previous 
government position for lucrative private contracts (known as the 
“revolving-door” problem) corrupt? Nonetheless, TI’s definition 
serves as a starting point in identifying what acts are certainly corrupt. 
In other words, it may not help us define all the borders, but it lets us 
 
 50. Jacob Eisler, McDonnell and Anti-Corruption’s Last Stand, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1619, 
1665 (2017). 
 51. This happens in many areas besides corruption. As Sheila Krumholz has argued in the 
campaign financing world, sophisticated actors are capable of arranging transactions that are legal 
in form but that violate the spirit of the law. See Sheila Krumholz, Campaign Cash and Corruption: 
Money in Politics, Post-Citizens United, 80 SOC. RSCH. 1119 (2013). 
 52. As Francis Fukuyama has argued, corruption lacks “conceptual precision.” See Francis 
Fukuyama, What Is Governance?, 26 GOVERNANCE 347, 349 (2013). 
 53. What is Corruption?, supra note 35. The World Bank has adopted this definition. See, e.g., 
Vinay Bhargava, Curing the Cancer of Corruption, in GLOBAL ISSUES FOR GLOBAL CITIZENS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO KEY DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES 341 (Vinay Bhargava ed., 2006) (“The 
World Bank defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain.”); see also RAY 
FISMAN & MIRIAM A. GOLDEN, CORRUPTION: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 25 (2017). 
 54. Kevin E. Davis, Corruption as a Violation of International Human Rights: A Reply to 
Anne Peters, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1289, 1290 n.5 (2018) (arguing that TI’s definition is problematic 
because “it focuses on the conduct of public officials and ignores the roles of private actors such as 
bribe payers and money launderers”). 
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make out the core of what corruption is. Following TI’s definition, it 
is clear that at least some of the exchanges between Sen. Menendez 
and Mr. Melgen were corrupt.55 
Nonetheless, not every act that is corrupt is a crime.56 This Article 
focuses on federal criminalized corruption.57 Evidently, an analysis of 
corruption could be broader. For example, there are questions about 
whether campaign finance58 and electoral politics59 as they currently 
exist are corrupt. However, this Article does not address those issues 
and only looks to the status of anti-corruption criminal law and the 
possibilities for reform. 
The responses to the Supreme Court’s rulings in this area have 
often centered on widening the scope of criminalized conduct. 
Matthew Stephenson, for example, has suggested re-drafting federal 
laws to penalize the type of nefarious conduct at issue in Kelly.60 In 
 
 55. Whether the political donations were corrupt is arguably unclear. On the one hand, they 
were clearly made as a way to push Sen. Menendez to act on Mr. Melgen’s behalf. However, use 
of political donations as a way to influence politics has been cleared by the Supreme Court as 
consistent with democracy. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 
(2010). However, private stays in hotels, and trips to beaches for political favor are clearly acts 
within TI’s definition. 
 56. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020). 
 57. Commentators have observed that the Supreme Court has largely obviated or ignored 
Federalism concerns in anti-corruption cases. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal 
Prosecution of State and Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 404 (2005) (arguing 
Sabri v. United States and McConnell v. Federal Elections Commission confirm “the high priority 
that the Court places on the National Government’s authority to fight corruption at any level”). 
 58. There are still campaign spending limits for campaign contributions; however, individuals 
can routinely bend these limitations. See Michael A. Rosenhouse, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Campaign Finance Laws—Supreme Court Cases, 19 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, 1 (2007); 
Nicole L. Jones, Citizens United Round II: Campaign Finance Disclosure, the First Amendment, 
and Expanding Exemptions and Loopholes for Corporate Influence on Elections, 93 DENV. L. REV. 
749, 749 (2016); Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. 
Elections & How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 383, 400 (2013). In fact, what is often misunderstood about Citizens United is that it did not 
alter this basic fact on campaign spending limits, but rather that it eliminated limits for independent 
expenditures. An independent expenditure is an expenditure for a communication that expressly 
advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate and which is not made in 
coordination with any candidate or his or her campaign or political party. See Understanding 
Independent Expenditures, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-
committees/candidate-taking-receipts/understanding-independent-expenditures/ (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2021). 
 59. Even if it had not, it is unlikely that it would have been found to be criminal under any of 
the criminal corruption statutes. 
 60. Matthew Stephenson, Aggressive Criminal Law Enforcement Is Insufficient to Combat 
Systemic Corruption. But That Doesn’t Mean It’s Not Necessary, THE GLOB. ANTICORRUPTION 
BLOG (Nov. 19, 2019), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2019/11/19/aggressive-criminal-law-
enforcement-is-insufficient-to-combat-systemic-corruption-but-that-doesnt-mean-its-not-
necessary/. 
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addition, some have suggested that states should do more to combat 
corruption locally.61 While surely this is possible, as I argue in Part 
IV, the actual scope of conduct that can/should be criminalized is very 
limited. Broad criminal statutes will suffer the same fate that the 
current anti-corruption criminal statutes have, and—more 
normatively—criminal statutes should be very narrowly tailored. 
Another option, suggested by Jacob Eisler, is that anti-corruption 
criminal statutes should be broadly interpreted to “encourage public-
mindedness in representative behavior.”62 However, as argued infra, 
given the already balkanized state of criminal law,63 proposals such as 
these are terribly fraught. Furthermore, international examples of 
countries adjusting criminal procedure for anti-corruption criminal 
statutes have failed spectacularly.64 Also, it is questionable that in a 
country with such a convoluted, confused, and overbearing criminal 
law system as the U.S., it would be wise to create a subset of crimes 
that get special procedural treatment.65 
Beyond the political economy problems66 of reforming federal 
and state anti-corruption criminal laws, there are reasons to believe 
 
 61. See, e.g., Bob Hennelly, Bridgegate Ruling Shows Our Over Reliance on Feds to Keep Lid 
on Corruption that Too Often Defines Us, INSIDERNJ (May 10, 2020, 9:44 AM), 
https://www.insidernj.com/bridgegate-ruling-shows-reliance-feds-keep-lid-corruption-often-
defines-us/. However, given the few incentives local legislators have of passing strong-
anticorruption laws, we can be skeptical of relying on state legislators to do so. 
 62. Eisler, supra note 50, at 1666. Eisler argues that this jurisprudential shift would need to be 
“delica[te] and circumscri[bed],” but that this could be achieved through civic conceptions of 
governance from the Court. Id. at 1667. He points to Einer Elhauge who argues that the rule of 
lenity is often not applied in business cases, because the people on trial are not the usual reo that 
require these procedural protections. See ELHAUGE, supra note 42, at 13. 
 63. Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as 
Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 644–55 (2006) (arguing that the federal penal 
code is such “a national disgrace,” with its various “vague, overbroad, or internally inconsistent 
laws” that it is actually impossible to efficiently and fairly administer criminal laws). 
 64. See Mariana Mota Prado & Marta Rodriguez Machado, Using Criminal Law to Fight 
Corruption: The Potential, Risks and Limitations of Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato), 68 AM. J. 
COMPAR. L. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (showing that Brazil is currently experiencing 
a drop in confidence in the rule of law which can be arguably traced back to bending criminal laws 
to forge ahead with criminal prosecutions). 
 65. As argued supra notes 41 and 42, the criminal law in this country is already impossible to 
administer in a consistent and just manner. Furthermore, it is questionable that the solution to 
problematic laws is not a replacement or amendment of those laws but more laws attacking the 
issue in a different way. See Saul Levmore, Addictive Law 10 (Aug. 20, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441870. 
 66. Public officials don’t have many incentives to further criminalize behavior that they are 
engaged in. The calculation would be different if there were no anti-bribery laws, or there were no 
prosecutions, but given that there are many laws and an active anti-corruption practice, there are 
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that the answer does not lie in criminal law. First, international anti-
corruption best-practices teach us that the criminal law is not meant to 
be the main tool to fight corruption.67 Rather, as Susan Rose-
Ackerman has argued, criminal law serves a “back-up role . . . as an 
aid to deterrence.”68 This is because corruption is not a problem of 
crime, but rather a problem of public administration and institutions.69 
Therefore, much of the regulation needs to target the creation of 
systems that prevent corrupt acts and that promote integrity and 
accountability. Which is to say, for anti-corruption efforts to be 
effective, it is necessary that a country is able to hold individuals 
criminally liable for the most egregious acts of corruption,70 but the 
majority of the gains are not made in the criminal realm. 
Given all the complications with criminal reform just outlined, 
and the relatively meager benefits of doing so, U.S. legislators and 
advocates should focus on strengthening non-penal controls for 
corruption. Currently, these systems have shown themselves to be 
completely inadequate to confront the various corrupt acts of self-
dealing and conflicts of interest in the Trump administration. President 
Trump has repeatedly circumvented, overstepped, and/or avoided 
consequences for violating governance norms and constitutional 
conventions, calling into question the robustness of the American 
public integrity system.71 Problematic as this may be, it serves to chart 
 
strong reasons to believe congresses will stall on this type of legislation. The fact that federal anti-
corruption bills such as Senator Leahy’s, discussed infra note 288, have stalled for almost 10 years 
and states have not passed bills in this arena is evidence of these dynamics. 
 67. Stephenson, supra note 60. 
 68. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and the Criminal Law, 2 F. ON CRIME & SOC’Y 3, 4 
(2002). 
 69. As I discuss in Part I, this was also one of the intellectual motivations for many of the 
institutions set-up at the time of the founding. Also, this type of institutional approach has the 
benefits of being able to address the problem of corruption more generally than only the “bright-
line” or criminal corruption. 
 70. This need not mean that we need the current system of criminal liability to have strong 
anti-corruption programs. One could imagine a system of accountability within an abolitionist 
framework. The point rather is that whatever and however that system penalizes, there needs to be 
room for certain corrupt acts—namely bribery and embezzlement—to be punished. For a 
discussion of the abolitionist framework, see Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded 
Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1239 (2015). 
 71. See e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President 
Donald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177, 177–78 (2018) (describing some of the ways President Trump has 
violated political norms and constitutional conventions, and the implications this has on the 
American political system as a whole); David A. Graham, The Last Constraint on Trump, THE 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 16, 2019), http://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/law-only-constraint 
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a path forward for anti-corruption reform. Focusing on administrative 
and civil sanctions for acts of corruption, and of leveraging current 
institutions used to prosecute criminal corruptions to also seek other 
types of sanctions, would potentially be substantively better and easier 
because these changes are not only more politically palatable, but they 
also fall in line with international anti-corruption best practices. In 
plain English, the wheel would not need to be reinvented. 
This Article proceeds as follows; in the first part I give a brief 
account of anti-corruption history in the United States. This part is 
important to establish the parameters of my object of study and to 
show that in fact an emphasis on criminal law as both a prophylactic 
and cure is relatively recent. Part II explores the Supreme Court’s most 
recent criminal anti-corruption cases. I analyze cases going back to 
McNally v. United States72 to explain the doctrines developed around 
the bribery and honest-services statutes, and the Hobbs Act. In the next 
part, I explore the consequences of these cases, making an argument 
that much of the criticism against the Supreme Court has been 
misguided and that in fact we have evidence that law enforcement can 
(and does) still carry out successfully corruption prosecutions. Finally, 
this Article makes the case that the solution to the risk of rising 
corruption can and should be addressed through institutional and 
administrative reform, rather than criminal reform. 
I.  A (VERY) BRIEF HISTORY OF ANTICORRUPTION IN AMERICA 
We have evidence of corruption as a public issue dating back at 
least to the Roman Empire.73 As Carlo Brioschi put it, “[i]n antiquity, 
greasing the wheels was a custom every bit as widespread as it is 
today.”74 Prosecutions of corruption have been just as long. The most 
famous prosecution from Roman antiquity is probably that of Gaius 
 
-trump/587266/ (arguing that the president’s aides disobeying his wishes have proven to be the best 
protection for the Rule of Law in the U.S.). 
 72. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 73. It may in fact be older. Plato in The Republic, for example, suggests that “public officials” 
(or guardians of the state) should never deal with money, that way it “will be kept safe, and they 
will keep the city safe.” PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 110 (G. R. F. Ferrari ed. & Tom Griffith trans., 
2000). 
 74. CARLO ALBERTO BRIOSCHI, CORRUPTION: A SHORT HISTORY 22 (Antony Shugaar trans., 
Brookings Institution Press 2017) (2010). 
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Verres, the governor and proprietor of Sicily from 73 to 70 BCE75 (its 
fame has more to do with the fact that the case was led by Cicero than 
with the actual facts). It is estimated that Verres stole more than 40 
million sesterces76 during his administration.77 However, even then 
winning corruption cases was hard. Despite having a mountain of 
evidence and strong oratorial skills, Cicero would have likely lost the 
case had Verres paid his jurors enough in bribes.78 
Nowadays, in the U.S. at least, prosecutions of corruption do not 
fail because those on trial are engaging in corruption (i.e., bribing the 
jurors or judges) in order to get away with it. Nonetheless, prosecuting 
corruption cases can be notoriously difficult for a number of reasons. 
First, the detection rate of cases is relatively low because there is often 
a dearth of whistleblowers or informed individuals with reliable 
information.79 Also, prosecuting corruption cases requires expertise in 
areas that most law enforcement agencies lack, “such as forensic 
accounting, public funds, or insider trading.”80 Another obstacle is that 
they types of parties involved—high ranking public officials and 
wealthy private sector actors—can employ sophisticated mechanisms 
to avoid detection or ensure impunity. Finally, and relatedly, these 
actors can be influential in government and can use that leverage to 
shield themselves from accountability.81 
 
 75. For more details of this case see Douglas O. Linder, The Trial of Gaius (or Caius) Verres: 
An Account, 3, 8 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra
ct_id=1305177. 
 76. A legionary earned around 900 sesterces a year at the time. M. Alexander Speidel, Roman 
Army Pay Scales, 82 J. ROMAN STUD. 87, 92 (1992). 
 77. Linder, supra note 75, at 9. 
 78. Verres was eventually found guilty, but he escaped to live in exile in Marseille. See id. at 
10. 
 79. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT & ASIAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK, EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION 7–8 (2007). 
 80. Id. at ix. 
 81. Many social scientists have described these sorts of issues as features of corruption as a 
principal agent-problem. This can take one of two meanings: citizens are the principals and 
bureaucrats/politicians are the agents, or politicians are principals and bureaucrats are their 
agencies. In most accounts of corruption, the former interpretation is the one that has most traction 
because it implies that the aggrieved party is the regular citizen. The principal-agent model 
emphasizes that the problem of corruption boils down to information asymmetries between agents 
and principals (these asymmetries are described in the paragraph above). For example, citizens do 
not want their officials to take bribes, but they have no way of knowing if they do, so officials take 
them. See, e.g., Nico Groendendijk, A Principal-Agent Model of Corruption, 27 CRIME L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 207, 207 (1997) (offering a more detailed account of corruption as a principal-agent 
problem); see also Heather Marquette & Caryn Peiffer, Corruption and Collective Action, 
DEVELOPMENTAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAM (2015), https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5544-
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The difficulty in prosecuting criminal corruption is one of the 
reasons experts argue that the issue is best tackled through a holistic 
agenda in which criminal law-enforcement plays only a small part. 
Several proponents of anti-corruption reform speak of the necessity of 
implanting “anti-corruption toolkits” (i.e., a set of legal reforms that if 
implemented together can help reduce corruption). These toolkits 
consist of changes that reduce the information asymmetry between 
public officials and citizens, that allow for more competition within 
government, and that professionalizes government capacities.82 
The history of anti-corruption efforts in the U.S. shows that the 
framers understood this intuition. In the early years of the American 
republic, corruption was rarely associated with crime. Some of that 
was of course due to the much more limited role that criminal law 
generally played in society at the time.83 But it was also because 
people at the time recognized that corruption “encompassed lawful 
abuses of power, not merely unlawful abuses or usurpations.”84 Which 
is to say, the framers understood that corruption is not only a problem 
of crime, but rather a problem of governance generally.85 
This is why the framers were concerned with establishing 
institutions that prevented corruption from even arising. The 
 
corruption-and-collective-action.pdf (arguing that corruption is both a collective action and 
principal-agent problem). 
 82. Anna Persson et al., Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a 
Collective Action Problem, 26 GOVERNANCE 449, 453 (2013) (summarizing the toolkits this way: 
reforms that look “in particular, to ‘close the loopholes for corruption’ . . . , the international 
community prescribes a ‘holistic anticorruption strategy,’ targeted at reducing discretion of public 
officials through privatization, deregulation, and meritocratic recruitment; reducing monopoly by 
promoting political and economic competition; increasing accountability by supporting 
democratization and increased public awareness (for political accountability) and bureaucratization 
(for administrative accountability); improving salaries of public officials, thereby increasing the 
opportunity cost of corruption if detected; improving the rule of law so that corrupt bureaucrats and 
politicians can be prosecuted and punished; and encouraging greater transparency of government 
decision making through deepening decentralization, increased public oversight through 
parliament, an independent media, as well as through the creation and encouragement of civil 
society watchdogs”). 
 83. See generally KRISTOFER ALLERFELDT, CRIME AND THE RISE OF MODERN AMERICA: A 
HISTORY FROM 1865–1941, at 164 (2011) (discussing the role and understanding of corruption in 
American history). 
 84. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF 
BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 50 (2014). 
 85. The reforms that I propose in Part IV, and much of what is included in Senator Warren’s 
Public Integrity Act for example, are driven in part by this realization. 
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Emoluments clause (Art. I § 9),86 the parceling of appointments power 
between the executive and legislative branches,87 and long residency 
requirements to be eligible for senate,88 were among the many choices 
of institutional design that sought to quell corruption while at the same 
time preserving administrative and governmental efficiency.89 
At the founding, the emphasis on anti-corruption as a project of 
institution building was so great that there was no criminal bribery 
enacted. In an early case, United States v. Worrall,90 the District Court 
of Pennsylvania threw out a corruption prosecution because there was 
“no proof that the criminal letter was written.”91 Overtime states began 
doing the work that the Federal Government was not, criminalizing 
both extortion and bribery. Zephyr Teachout explains that in this 
period there was great variance in what was punished in each state. 
For example, in Maryland and Pennsylvania there was strict liability 
for just taking any money beyond one’s salary as a public official, 
while North Carolina and Massachusetts required a mens rea of 
intent.92 
Eventually, in 1853 the first federal U.S. bribery law was passed. 
However, as mentioned above, the criminal law did not play the 
central role in governance in general as it does today, and we thus saw 
relatively few prosecutions. In general, for its first 140 years, the U.S. 
did not convict any high-level officials of bribery.93 This was not for 
a want of scandals, but rather because the idea of using criminal law 
to punish high-level officials was anathema.94 
By the turn of the twentieth century, things started to change with 
the prosecutions of Senator John Mitchell of Oregon95 in 1903 and the 
 
 86. In Zephyr Teachout’s book on corruption, she cites Edmund Randolph, a Virginian 
attendee to the Constitutional Convention who explained that “this restriction was provided to 
prevent corruption.” TEACHOUT, supra note 84, at 27. 
 87. There was a concern that public office would be sought only to get a lucrative appointment 
as an ambassador or to give his friends or family some benefits. A way to ensure that this wouldn’t 
happen was to allow the legislature to intervene in the appointments process. Id. at 65. 
 88. Id. at 75. 
 89. Teachout argues that “the Constitutional Convention had defined the republic as a nation 
preoccupied with corruption.” Id. at 82. 
 90. 2 U.S. 384 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798). 
 91. Id. at 388. 
 92. TEACHOUT, supra note 84, at 112–13. 
 93. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 565 (1984). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Senator Mitchell was indicted in the Oregon land fraud scandal which involved public 
officials in Oregon illegally selling Federal Government land grants meant for settlement to timber 
developers. Id. at 602. 
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Teapot Dome scandal of 1921.96 Eventually prosecutors began using 
different types of statutes to prosecute corruption cases. One often 
used statute, further discussed infra because it was the target of various 
recent Supreme Court decisions, the Hobbs Act was an 
antiracketeering law that targeted extortion “under color of official 
right.”97 Eventually courts begun accepting the argument that 
extortion was the same as bribery and “under color of official right” 
meant that a public official could be guilty thereof. The courts agreed 
with this, and until McNally v. United States, many anticorruption 
prosecutions were brought under this statute. 
Teachout has outlined this period as one in which attitudes about 
the contours of bribery were very blurry: 
State courts allowed prosecutions for bribes that were offered 
but not accepted, . . . that did not clarify the precise official 
action that the briber wanted done, [an official could be 
guilty of bribery] even if he had no intent to change his 
behavior, . . . [or] being influenced on actions over which she 
had no authority.98 
Why courts accepted more and more wide-ranging interpretations 
of anti-corruption criminal law statutes is unclear. Perhaps it was part 
of a broader change where criminal law began to take a more central 
role in social control. However, the timeline of the change does not 
neatly line up with that explanation; after all, the punitive turn in 
American politics was not until the 1970s, and the changes in anti-
corruption prosecutions began much earlier.99 Another potential 
explanation could simply be that attitudes about who could be 
prosecuted changed as the United States enfranchised more people.100 
At the beginning of the American Republic—and through its first 
century—public officials, judges, prosecutors and electors were 
 
 96. In which President Warren G. Harding’s Secretary of the Interior Albert Bacon Fall 
became the first ever presidential cabinet member to be sentenced to prison after being convicted 
of bribery for leasing Navy oil reserves to private oil companies without a competitive bidding 
process in exchange for a personal no-interest loan and numerous valuable gifts. Id. at 565. 
 97. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2018). 
 98. TEACHOUT, supra note 84, at 200. 
 99. See, e.g., JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—
AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 234 (2017) (explaining the various factors influencing the 
growth in prison population in the United States). 
 100. Despite the democratic commitments at the founding, a large swath of the population was 
disenfranchised for at least the first 140 years of the republic (Black people and women, to name 
two very large groups). 
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largely of the same social class, race, and cohort, which could explain 
why prosecutions were relatively rare. As the electorate grew 
however, prosecutors and judges begun having a self-interest in 
charging and convicting corrupt public officials. 
Whatever the reason, by the 1980s bribery and other anti-
corruption criminal statutes were being used liberally. However, as we 
will see in the subsequent part, slowly but surely the Supreme Court 
chipped away at the expansive use of these statutes. Zephyr Teachout 
has argued that this move was carried out following the same logic 
with which the Court started rubberstamping a no-holds approach to 
campaign finance. In essence, Teachout argues the Court has a myopic 
view of corruption that impedes it from enforcing laws in a way that 
eliminates both “bright-line” (criminal) and systemic corruption. 
In the following part, I articulate a different explanation for the 
outcomes in the anti-corruption criminal cases. As I explain infra, the 
fact that, in contrast to the campaign finance cases, most of the anti-
corruption criminal cases have been decided unanimously and none 
have gone 5-4, tells us that the members of the court are distinguishing 
these cases from the campaign finance ones. In the following part I 
argue that in fact these decisions are more easily interpreted as 
opinions about criminal law specifically, not about corruption, 
generally.101 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTI-CORRUPTION JURISPRUDENCE AND 
THE “TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL LAW INTERPRETATION” 
Focusing only on criminal anti-corruption cases narrows the 
scope of analysis to a very particular subset of acts of corruption102 
and only a few cases. In the last ten years the Supreme Court has 
decided two important criminal anti-corruption cases: Kelly v. United 
States,103 in 2020, McDonnell v. United States104 in 2016. It also 
looked at three different cases in June 2010 which had major 
 
 101. Evidently some Justices could be motivated by their views on corruption, especially given 
their criminal law jurisprudence. However, as a Court, the outcomes have relied on arguments about 
the criminal law specifically. 
 102. Some writers make the distinction between general and specific corruption, general being 
in line with TI’s definition, while specific is tied to the crimes of bribery or embezzlement. See 
FISMAN & GOLDEN, supra note 53, at 23–26 (explaining the reasons some authors rely on broader 
or narrower definitions of corruption). 
 103. 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020). 
 104. 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
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consequences for public anti-corruption prosecutions105: Skilling v. 
United States,106 Weyhrauch v. United States,107 and Black v. United 
States.108 Looking further back, there have been a few more cases that 
have been crucial to understanding how the Court has analyzed 
criminal anti-corruption statutes.109 These cases deal with wire and 
honest-services fraud, bribery, and embezzlement. 
Most of these cases have been decided in the defendants’ favor.110 
Also, practically all of the cases were decided unanimously and those 
that were not had wide majorities. These patterns are evidently not 
conclusive of anything, but they do force us to look closely at the 
decisions to understand this seeming non-partisanship. After all, it is 
seldom that the Supreme Court is on such a degree of agreement even 
on cases that revolve around one particular area of law. Furthermore, 
as outlined in the introduction, after each of these decisions, the 
Supreme Court has been attacked in the popular press and in some 
legal commentary about its apparent tolerance of corruption.111 
Kelly, Skilling, and McNally all revolve around the “honest 
services” doctrine. To understand that doctrine, we must first look at 
a 1909 amendment of the 1872 mail-fraud statute to prohibit “any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises.”112 The “honest-services” doctrine arose out of the fact that 
there was not (and is not) a federal statute that can lead to the 
prosecution of state and local political corruption.113 So, prosecutors 
used (and courts validated) the mail-fraud statute from 1909 to 
prosecute cases of local corruption, including schemes that lead to no 
pecuniary harm but instead deprived people of the “honest services” 
 
 105. Although out of the cases decided in 2010 only Weyhrauch involved public corruption, 
the Supreme Court remanded that case to be decided in light of Skilling. On remand, the Ninth 
Circuit dismissed the case against a local public official in Alaska in light of the outcome of Skilling, 
which was a private, not public, honest services case. 
 106. 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
 107. 561 U.S. 476 (2010). 
 108. 561 U.S. 465 (2010). 
 109. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999); Sabri v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992); McCormick v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 110. All the defendants were accused of engaging in public corruption. 
 111. See, e.g., Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 21; Litman, supra note 21; Millhiser, supra note 
21. 
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018). 
 113. O’Sullivan, supra note 63, at 660–61. 
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of a person or group.114 This doctrine allowed the Federal Government 
to prosecute corruption cases where “the betrayed party suffered no 
deprivation of money or property . . . . For example, if a city mayor 
(the offender) accepted a bribe from a third party in exchange for 
awarding that party a city contract, yet the contract terms were the 
same as any that could have been negotiated at arm’s length, the city 
(the betrayed party) would suffer no tangible loss.”115 However, note 
that there is no “fraud” necessarily in public corruption.116 “The 
gravamen of an honest services case was not the corruption; it was the 
‘fraud’ of failing to tell the citizenry about the corruption or allegedly 
improper conduct. (If the public official did disclose his alleged 
wrongdoing, there was no case.).”117 
In 1987, the Supreme Court put a stop to the increasingly 
expanding use of the honest services doctrine in McNally v. United 
States.118 The case centered around allegations against public officials 
in Kentucky that had set up a scheme whereby the insurance agent 
chosen to provide insurance for the state was to share its commissions 
with other insurance agencies, including one in which the public 
officials setting up the scheme had property interests.119 Crucially, it 
was not alleged that under the scheme Kentucky was paying more than 
it would have otherwise paid for insurance, or that because of it the 
state lost money or property. Reviewing 18 U.S.C. section 1341, the 
Court held that the mail fraud statute was meant to prevent only the 
use of mails in furtherance of schemes seeking to deprive someone of 
their property rights.120 And so, if no property rights were lost then 
there was no crime. Adding that “[i]f Congress desires to go further, it 
must speak more clearly than it has.”121 The public officials’ 
convictions in that case were thus thrown out. 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 400 (2010). 
 116. In the sense that not every act of corruption is meant “to induce another to act to his or her 
detriment.” See Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 117. O’Sullivan, supra note 63, at 660 (emphasis omitted). 
 118. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 119. Id. at 352–53. 
 120. Id. at 360. 
 121. Id. 
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In a somewhat confusing passage, without saying it explicitly, the 
Court justified its interpretation of section 1341 on the rule of lenity.122 
The Court explained that it was looking to “construe the statute in a 
manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous,”123 and that “when 
there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than 
the other, we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken 
in clear and definite language.”124 Here, section 1341 could be read as 
protecting only property rights or to also protect “an intangible 
right . . . to good government.”125 Following the limiting principle 
then, the Court decided in favor of the more restrictive 
interpretation.126 McNally was the first in the line of cases that relied 
on traditional canons of criminal law interpretation to tighten the 
statutes used to prosecute criminal corruption. 
Congress responded to McNally by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1346 
clarifying the “term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’” found in sections 
1341 and 1343.127 Section 1346 codifies the honest services doctrine 
stating: “the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or 
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”128 
This provision not only criminalizes public theft of “honest services” 
but also “private cases,” where private entities are prosecuted for 
impeding the employers from enjoying the right to their honest 
services. The doctrine has been much maligned in the private sphere. 
Julie O’Sullivan, for example, argued that section 1346 “fail[s] to 
provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to 
understand what conduct it prohibits . . . [and] authorize[s] and even 
encourage[s] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”129 
 
 122. This is a canonical tool of interpretation of criminal law. It states that ambiguous criminal 
statutes will be interpreted “in favor of the more lenient punishment.” Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 123. McNally, 483 U.S. at 360. 
 124. Id. at 359–60. 
 125. Id. at 356. 
 126. Id. at 360. 
 127. The swiftness of the reversal speaks to the fact that Congress was signaling their strong 
disagreement with McNally and their desire to equip prosecutors with better anti-corruption tools. 
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Julie R. O’Sullivan, Honest-Services Fraud: A (Vague) Threat to Millions of Blissfully 
Unaware (and Non-Culpable) American Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 23, 24 (2010) 
(quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999)) (arguing that fair-notice concerns are 
present because of the varying and disparate case-law interpreting the honest-services doctrine, that 
the statute is extremely vague in that it does not specify what standard of conduct an individual 
should comply with). 
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Nonetheless, after the enactment of section 1346, the doctrine was 
tremendously influential in prosecuting public and private 
corruption.130 
In 2010, in Skilling v. United States,131 the Court reviewed section 
1346 in the case against Jeffrey Skilling, one of Enron’s leading 
executives.132 In that case, among other things, Mr. Skilling was 
charged with honest-services wire fraud,133 for depriving Enron and 
its shareholders of its honest-services by manipulating publicly 
reported financial reports and making false statements.134 Skilling 
argued that section 1346 was unconstitutionally vague.135 The Court 
did not agree with Skilling, and preserved the statute.136 However, in 
a unanimous decision,137 it held that section 1346 only encompasses 
“bribery and kickback schemes.”138 The Court did not support the 
Government’s position that section 1346 proscribed “undisclosed self-
dealing by a public official or private employee—i.e., the taking of 
official action by the employee that furthers his own undisclosed 
 
 130. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rybicki v. United States, 543 U.S. 809 (2004) 
(No. 03-1375) (noting that section 1346 has been considered in more than 270 federal decisions 
between 1988 and March 2004). 
 131. Skilling is a private case. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 367 (2010). However, it 
was decided with two companion cases, one of which involved charges of public corruption: 
Weyhrauch. The holding in Skilling led to the reversal of a conviction in Weyhrauch. This shows 
that the limiting principle articulated by the Court in Skilling is equally applicable in public or 
private honest-services cases. Weyhrauch v. United States, 561 U.S. 476 (2010). 
 132. Enron was an energy, services, and commodities company that went bankrupt in 2001 (at 
the time it was the largest bankruptcy in history). Skilling, 561 U.S. at 367–68. The fallout led to a 
number of investigations that uncovered extensive accounting fraud and corruption. Id. at 368. 
Jeffrey Skilling was one of the top executives implicated in the scandal. See id. at 368–69. 
 133. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2018). 
 134. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 369. 
 135. Id. at 376. Because the penal statute did not “define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner 
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352, 357 (1983). 
 136. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412. By the time the Supreme Court took on Skilling, perhaps because 
of its extensive use by the Justice Department, the honest-services doctrine had come under attack 
from many practitioners and scholars. Capturing a general sentiment, Julie O’Sullivan previewed 
the Court’s decision and argued that “if any statute is unconstitutionally vague, it is 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1346.” See O’Sullivan, supra note 129, at 23. 
 137. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 366. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurrence, joined in part by Justices 
Breyer and Stevens, that did not object to the Court’s conclusions on the honest-services statute, 
but rather objected to the finding that Skilling had received a fair trial. Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justices Thomas and Kennedy, meanwhile argued that section 1346 should have been struck 
wholesale. To put it another way, there was no disagreement at all that the statute at issue was 
problematic. 
 138. Id. at 368. 
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financial interests while purporting to act in the interests of those to 
whom he owes a fiduciary duty.”139 The Court viewed this as a 
compromise; a limiting principle that preserved the statute but did not 
allow its extension to any number of conducts. 
Explaining why the Court did not hold the statute 
unconstitutional, the Court stated that it was their practice, “before 
striking a federal statute as impermissibly vague, to consider whether 
the prescription is amenable to a limiting construction.”140 The 
limiting construction in this case was the result of an examination of 
how the honest-services doctrine was used pre-McNally and pre-
section 1346.141 The Government argued against this construction 
saying that the language in section 1346 and its legislative history 
indicated that the statute meant to punish the “undisclosed self-dealing 
by a public official or private employee—i.e., the taking of official 
action by the employee that furthers his own undisclosed financial 
interests while purporting to act in the interests of those to whom he 
owes a fiduciary duty.”142 The Court, however, found that most 
prosecutions, including the one in McNally, were for kickbacks and/or 
bribes, not for failing to disclose conflicts of interest.143 Moreover, it 
cited the rule of lenity in favor of its more restrictive construction.144 
Reading over Skilling now that the outrage of the scandal has 
faded from memory, it is hard to see how the decision was 
controversial. Section 1346 presents many problems of ambiguity, and 
the Court engaged in a fairly simple analysis using the traditional tools 
of criminal law to resolve the issue. The case serves to illustrate what 
the Court once again underlined in the recent case of Kelly v. United 
States: “not every corrupt act . . . is a federal crime.”145 In Kelly, the 
Court reversed a conviction of wire fraud and fraud on a federally 
funded program or entity against two public officials.146 In that case, 
the Federal Government prosecuted public officials of the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey for closing two traffic lanes 
 
 139. Id. at 409–10. 
 140. Id. at 405. 
 141. Id. at 407–08. 
 142. Id. at 409. 
 143. Id. at 410. 
 144. Id. (“Further dispelling doubt on this point is the familiar principle that ‘ambiguity 
concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.’” (citing Cleveland 
v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000)). 
 145. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020). 
 146. Id. 
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in Fort Lee, New Jersey in retaliation for Fort Lee’s mayor’s refusal 
for supporting then New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s re-election 
campaign.147 
 At issue were 18 U.S.C. § 1343148 and § 666(a)(1)(A)149 which 
criminalized the same thing: the use of fraudulent schemes to obtain 
money or property. In a short and unanimous decision, the Court threw 
out the convictions.150 This decision did not even involve the use of 
any limiting principle to construe the statute, rather it relied on a close 
inspection of the elements of the crime. The Court found that the both 
section 1343 and section 666(a)(1)(A) require that the fraud is used to 
obtain property.151 Furthermore, it cannot be that some property or 
money could be gained incidentally to the scheme, but rather the 
property “must play more than some bit part in a scheme: [i]t must be 
an ‘object of the fraud.’”152 The public officials in Kelly had not 
schemed to obtain property or money.153 Rather, they had schemed for 
“political payback.”154 The case solicited much outrage because the 
Port Authority officials had clearly behaved in a morally reprehensible 
and corrupt manner; however, the Supreme Court simply articulated 
what every 1L learns: not all bad acts are crimes. 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence surrounding the bribery 
statute has been more controversial (and maligned) than the honest-
service cases. In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of 
California,155 the Court looked at a case where a trade association of 
growers of raisins, figs, walnuts, prunes, and hazelnuts, Sun-Diamond, 
had given a number of gifts totaling over $5,000 in value to the then 
 
 147. Id. at 1568. 
 148. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (criminalizing “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining 
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises . . . by 
means of wire [or] radio . . . communications”). 
 149. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(1)(A) (2018) (criminalizing when a public official “embezzles, steals, 
obtains by fraud, or otherwise without authority knowingly converts to the use of any person other 
than the rightful owner or intentionally misapplies, property”). 
 150. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1568. 
 151. Id. at 1572. 
 152. Id. at 1573. If the statute also covered incidental losses such as the lost-hours of state 
employees that closed the traffic lanes then “even a practical joke” could be criminalized. Id. at 
1573 n.2. Furthermore, it would be inconsistent with the Court’s holdings in Cleveland v. United 
States and McNally, which established that “Federal prosecutors may not use property fraud statutes 
to ‘set[] standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials.’” Kelly, 140 S. 
Ct. at 1574 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
(6) 54.4_GERSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/21  8:16 PM 
2021] CROOKED POLITICIANS 1039 
Secretary of Agriculture, Mike Espy.156 Espy was prosecuted under 18 
U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), the gratuity subsection of the statute, which 
forbids gifts, “for or because of any official act performed or to be 
performed.”157 The basis of the prosecution was that Espy had 
received the gifts at the time he was considering two policies that 
would impact Sun-Diamond.158 The Court held that for a gift to be a 
criminal gratuity, there needs to be a connection between the gift and 
the official act performed.159 
In that case, the debate was about whether the gratuity statute 
precluded “any effort to buy favor or . . . goodwill from an official,”160 
or whether the payment had to be linked to a particular act by the 
public official. The Government contended that it was the former.161 
The Court, unanimously, disagreed.162 Relying on the “for or because 
of any official act” language, the Court found that the statute only 
included gifts tied to particular acts.163 Furthermore, it argued, the 
contrary meaning would criminalize “token gifts.”164 Finally, the 
Court found the Government’s broad interpretation inconsistent with 
other provisions of both criminal and administrative law that regulate 
gift-giving.165 This opinion could be read as another one based on 
close textual interpretation of a criminal statute to avoid issues of 
overbreadth. As Justice Scalia wrote, “[A] statute in this field that can 
linguistically be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should 
reasonably be taken to be the latter.”166 
In a more recent, and more famous, case, the Court once again 
reviewed the scope of the bribery statute. In McDonnell v. United 
 
 156. Id. at 400–01. 
 157. Id. at 401. 
 158. Id. One was a plan to provide federal funds to fray international marketing costs for 
companies like the ones represented by Sun Diamond; the other was a regulation of methyl 
bromide, a pesticide. Id. at 401–02. 
 159. Id. at 405. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 406. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 406–07. 
 165. In particular, the Court identified other criminal statutes that indicated more clearly that 
they meant to preclude gift giving more broadly, such as 18 U.S.C. § 209(a), which criminalizes 
broadly supplementing an executive public official’s salary, without regard to the purpose of the 
payment. Id. at 408–09. It also pointed to administrative regulations, such as 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202 
which precluded gifts from “prohibited sources” but then has many exceptions to this prohibition, 
exceptions that would limit the gratuity statute as interpreted by the Government. Id. at 411. 
 166. Id. at 412. 
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States, the main issue was what constitutes an “official act,” as used 
in 18 U.S.C. § 201 (a)(3).167 In that case, former Virginia Governor 
Robert McDonnell and his wife, Maureen McDonnell, were indicted 
by the Federal Government on honest services fraud and Hobbs Act 
extortion after they accepted $175,000 in loans, vacations, and gifts 
(like a Rolex and a $20,000 shopping spree) from Jonnie Williams, a 
businessman.168 In return, Mr. and Mrs. McDonnell hosted an event at 
the governor’s mansion to promote a product produced by Mr. 
Williams, a supplement called Anatabloc, and encouraged public 
universities to do research on the product.169 
The bribery statute prohibits intending to influence or being 
influenced in an official act. “In other words, for bribery there must be 
a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive something of 
value in exchange for an official act.”170 In McDonnell, the Court 
adopted a “bounded interpretation of ‘official act,’”171 holding that the 
term refers to a “decision or action on a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy.’”172 The “‘question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy’ must involve a formal exercise of 
governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit before a 
court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a 
committee.”173 This definition is not so narrow as to require that only 
actions deriving from formal legal powers constitute legal acts. After 
all, the Court found that pressuring another official to do an “official 
act” was enough to violate the statute.174 Whether the things that 
McDonnell did on Mr. Williams’ behalf, like hosting events for him, 
expressing support for his product, and having subordinates meet with 
him, were “official acts” is a question the Court said could be reviewed 
in a new trial with jury instructions reflecting the new “official act” 
definition.175 
Much of the public debate about McDonnell has had to do with 
whether or not payment for access was corrupt. As the non-profit 
 
 167. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361 (2016). 
 168. Id. at 2362–64. 
 169. Id. at 2363. 
 170. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 404–05 (emphasis omitted). 
 171. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 172. Id. at 2371. 
 173. Id. at 2371–72. 
 174. Id. at 2370. 
 175. Id. at 2375. Ultimately the Government decided to not retry the case, however. 
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Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington argued in its 
brief in support of the Government, “[t]his is not a case where 
McDonnell provided access as an extension of his ‘favor [for] certain 
policies’ and thus his ‘favor [for] the voters and contributors who 
support those policies.’”176 Many commentators have interpreted 
McDonell to mean that the Court rejected this argument, pointing to 
this passage: “[t]he basic compact underlying representative 
government assumes that public officials will hear from their 
constituents and act appropriately on their concerns.”177 Notice, 
however, that the Court does not say in fact that access can never be a 
sign of corruption. As Chief Justice Roberts wrote: 
this is not to say that setting up a meeting, hosting an event, 
or making a phone call is always an innocent act, or is 
irrelevant, in cases like this one. If an official sets up a 
meeting, hosts an event, or makes a phone call on a question 
or matter that is or could be pending before another official, 
that could serve as evidence of an agreement to take an 
official act.178 
Given the facts of McDonnell, it is hard to think that what 
happened was not bribery. The Court, in fact, did not conclude that it 
was not; it remanded the case for a jury to decide.179 It was the 
Department of Justice that decided it was not by choosing not to 
prosecute it again. The Court acknowledges that this case is not about 
a “normal political interaction between public officials and their 
constituents . . . . [b]ut the Government’s legal interpretation is not 
confined to cases involving extravagant gifts or large sums of money, 
and we cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the 
Government will ‘use it responsibly.’”180 This tells us that the Court 
recognized that what happened in McDonnell’s case was wrong but 
concluded that adopting a broad understanding of the statute that goes 
against the canons of criminal statutory construction as well as its own 
 
 176. Brief of Amicus Curiae for Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington in 
Support of Respondent at 8, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474), 2016 WL 1445327 (citations 
omitted) (alterations in original). 
 177. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 178. Id. at 2371. 
 179. Id. at 2375. 
 180. Id. at 2372–73 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480, (2010)). 
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precedent was unwarranted.181 Again, the issue is not if these acts were 
corrupt (the opinion indicates that the Court believes they were) but 
rather if they were criminal. 
McDonnell is a progeny of Sun-Diamond of sorts.182 Like in that 
case, in McDonnell the Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the 
bribery statute: only decisions or actions based on a pending issue or 
controversy are “official acts” subject to criminal liability under 
section 201.183 Many have argued that the Court’s reasoning is illusory 
as there is no clear line dividing “formal exercise[s] of governmental 
power”184 from informal ones.185 Nonetheless, the Court was precisely 
concerned with vagueness when creating this test, and in its view, it 
provides more clarity than simply saying that any act can be official.186 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Hobbs Act has been 
somewhat more confused than those of the other anti-corruption 
criminal statutes analyzed.187 This statute makes it a crime for a public 
official to receive a payment in exchange for a “specific requested 
exercise of his or her official power.”188 In McCormick v. United 
 
 181. The Court argued that it was concerned with “cast[ing] a pall of potential prosecution” 
over politics as usual. Id. at 2372. After all, adopting a broad interpretation of official act, Chief 
Justice Roberts argued, could criminalize routine political activity such as “arrang[ing] meetings 
for constituents, contact[ing] other officials on their behalf, and includ[ing] them in events all the 
time.” Id. Much of the criticism around McDonnell centered on this conception of politics. If buying 
access was not bribery, then what was? See Eisler, supra note 50 passim (describing this narrowing 
interpretation as a reflection of the Court’s agonist politics). 
 182. George Brown, for example, argues that the decision seems to follow Sun-Diamond’s 
admonition that “[b]ecause . . . an area where precisely targeted prohibitions are commonplace, and 
where more general prohibitions have been qualified by numerous exceptions, a statute that can 
linguistically be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken to be 
the latter.” George D. Brown, McDonnell and the Criminalization of Politics, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 
22 n.115 (2017) (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 399 (1999)) 
(emphasis added). 
 183. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 184. Id. 
 185. The case attracted intense media interest and commentary, most of it negative. For a look 
at how the case was seen before the decision, see, e.g., George F. Will, Virginia’s Former Governor 
Faces Prison Over Politics, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/virginias-former-governor-faces-prison-over-
politics/2016/01/06/2af3ff74-b3e6-11e5-9388-466021d971de_story.html; see also Stephenson, 
supra note 24 (arguing that “the Court’s opinion both bespeaks an unrealistic view of how senior 
politicians exert influence over policy, and places undue weight on concerns about chilling 
(allegedly) desirable conduct”). 
 186. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361. 
 187. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 
 188. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 258 (1992) (citations omitted). The opinion further 
clarifies that the meaning of extortion in this statute should be interpreted as it was in common law, 
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States,189 in a 6-3 opinion, the Court threw out a conviction against a 
state representative under the Hobbs Act because the jury was told that 
they did not have to find a quid pro quo existed to convict.190 The 
Court held that the Hobbs Act did require a quid pro quo.191 So, for a 
conviction under the Hobbs Act, the Government must show that a 
payment was made with the expectation that it would lead to a specific 
benefit.192 This decision, curtailing Hobbs Act prosecutions to quid 
pro quos, is in line with the trend that I have outlined in this chapter. 
In Evans v. United States,193 however, once again a divided court 
held in favor of the Government in a prosecution of a public official 
from Georgia.194 In that case the Court once again analyzed the 
elements of the crime of extortion under the Hobbs Act.195 The issue 
was whether, to commit the crime of extortion, a public official had to 
induce the payment or if passive acceptance was enough.196 The Court 
concluded that, once a quid pro quo was established, passive 
acceptance was enough to find a conviction.197 This meant that the 
official did not have to ask for the bribe, but simply take it.198 This 
decision is one of the few anti-corruption decisions that have gone in 
the way of the Government. It is also unclear why the Court held this 
way; after all, as Justice Thomas argues in his dissent, there must be a 
difference between bribery and extortion.199 For him, that difference 
is that extortion contains the element “under color of office,” which 
means that “[t]he money or thing received must have been claimed, or 
accepted, in right of office, and the person paying must have been 
yielding to official authority.”200 In sum, inducement is a necessary 
 
finding that “[e]xtortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of what we would now 
describe as ‘taking a bribe.’” Id. at 260. 
 189. 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
 190. Id. at 274. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Evans, 504 U.S. at 255. 
 194. Id. at 256–57. The outcome was 6–3, but both Justice O’Connor and Kennedy filed 
separate concurring opinions. Id. 
 195. Id. Justice Thomas expressed misgivings about this statute in his dissent, stating that 
“[o]ver the past 20 years, the Hobbs Act has served as the engine for a stunning expansion of federal 
criminal jurisdiction into a field traditionally policed by state and local laws—acts of public 
corruption by state and local officials.” Id. at 290 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 196. Id. at 256. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 266. 
 199. Id. at 280 n.2. 
 200. Id. at 281. 
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element of the crime. This was obviously not the view of the Court, 
and it complicates the narrative that for the past three decades the 
Court has been rubberstamping public acts of malfeasance under the 
notion of politics as usual.201 
Another anti-corruption case that the Government won is Sabri v. 
United States.202 In that case, the Court examined 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666(a)(2), which proscribes state and local bribery in entities that 
receive $10,000 in federal funds.203 The issue was, can the Federal 
Government extend its jurisdictional hook to prosecute the crime at 
the local level, even if the federal funds that the local government 
receives are not used in the bribery scheme.204 A unanimous court held 
that Congress could enact § 666 under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause of Article I, § 8.205 This case was therefore not strictly about 
the contours of the statute, but about what Congress could 
constitutionally criminalize. It was a big win for the Department of 
Justice because it allowed the Federal Government to prosecute 
strictly local conduct. However, this case was not really about what 
the court considers to be criminal corruption. Prosecutors going after 
state and local conduct will still be bound by all the other anti-
corruption jurisprudence. 
Despite these two cases, as has been laid out, the majority of the 
opinions, and all the most recent ones, have been both unanimous and 
pro-defendant.206 It is clear that the Supreme Court’s analyses in the 
majority of the anti-corruption cases shows that the Justices are 
preoccupied with the potential over-inclusivity of criminal law statutes 
or, in the words of Chief Justice Roberts, “overzealous 
prosecut[ions].”207 There may be questions as to why practically all 
Justices in thirty years of reviewing these particular statutes have only 
been consistently preoccupied with these kinds of defendants.208 As 
 
 201. See Eisler, supra note 50, at 1633 n.40. 
 202. 541 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 203. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)–(b) (2018). 
 204. Sabri, 541 U.S. at 602–04. 
 205. Id. at 607. 
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 85–141. 
 207. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016). 
 208. While some conservative Justices like Scalia generally wrote and voted in consistently 
pro-defendant opinions, others like Alito and Thomas have not always done so. However, in these 
corruption cases, when the defendants have been white, educated, and powerful, these Justices have 
voted in their favor. As mentioned in the introduction, there are important questions about the 
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Stevens wrote in his dissent in McNally, about the outcome leaving 
“lingering questions about why a Court that has not been particularly 
receptive to the rights of criminal defendants in recent years has acted 
so dramatically to protect the elite class of powerful individuals who 
will benefit from this decision.”209 Nonetheless, that there may be 
ideological or political210 factors driving each vote is a fact of every 
case that reaches the Court.211 
I do not mean to suggest that the Court’s jurisprudence has 
clarified all the boundaries of anticorruption criminal statutes. For 
example, though McDonnell makes certain lines about what is an 
official act, it still leaves room for disagreement. Is sending an email 
expressing a preference that a contract be awarded to a certain 
provider, but not mandating that it be, a formal exercise of power? One 
can probably come up with scenarios in which that act would be an 
official one and in which it could not. However, demanding total 
clarity in these types of cases may be far-fetched. After all, we do not 
even really know what a quid pro quo is, for each element of a quid 
pro quo can be subject to interpretation. Is a job recommendation a 
quo? Is booking the politician’s daughter’s restaurant a quid? Does the 
passage of time obviate the pro? As the Sixth Circuit put it: “not all . . . 
quid pro quos are made of the same stuff.”212 
 
motivations behind many of the Justices’ votes; however, a strictly political interpretation does not 
fit the outcome of anti-corruption prosecutions. If that were the case, then we would expect a 
divided court with liberals voting with the Government. Another explanation is that regardless of 
politics, Justices vote to protect their peers. Perhaps. However, trying to divine the motivations 
behind each Justice’s vote is an unlikely to be fruitful path for research. 
 209. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 377 (1987). 
 210. Eisler, supra note 22, has argued that this interpretation belies a particular view of politics. 
Judge Lynn Adelman, meanwhile, says that these decisions show a concern only for those 
defendants of the same milieu as the Justices thereby reflecting personal concerns more than solely 
jurisprudential ones. Adelman, supra note 23, at 13–14. 
 211. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 212. United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 517 (6th Cir. 2009). The court in that case held that 
the quo need not be a specific act but the understanding that the official would curry favor for the 
bribe-giver when the opportunity arose. Id. at 521. In that particular case, the court was looking at 
extortion under the Hobbs Act, which the court defined as a public official knowingly receiving a 
bribe. Id. at 518. The Supreme Court denied certiorari but given the arguments in McDonnell and 
Skilling, discussed infra, it is questionable whether the Court would have upheld the Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoning. Abbey v. United States, 558 U.S. 1051 (2009). The Sixth Circuit ignored Sun-Diamond, 
discussed infra, relying on statutory differences between the Hobbs Act and 18 U.S.C. § 201 
(2018). Abbey, 560 F.3d at 521. While those differences are there, the discussion infra shows that 
more than statutory construction, the Supreme Court has been preoccupied with limiting 
prosecutions to a very discrete set of behaviors: actually giving/promising bribes for actions. The 
holding that criminal law prohibits the buying of indeterminate influence sits uneasy in the wake 
of Skilling, McDonnell, and even Citizens United (also discussed infra). 
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As scholars of corruption have indicated, that criminal 
anticorruption statutes are to a large extent indeterminate is 
inevitable.213 This is because there is no bright line between corrupt 
and non-corrupt conduct. Of course, there is behavior that is clearly in 
one camp and not the other, but a lot of it falls in between. The 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence just explored suggests that the Court 
is aware of this and is reserving the criminal liability only for conduct 
that is outside of that gray area. There may be concerns that this 
interpretation is underinclusive;214 however, in criminal law we tend 
to be more preoccupied when the statutes are overinclusive.215 
There is a question as to whether this formal or legalistic 
interpretation has actually curtailed the Federal Government’s ability 
to prosecute corruption. As seen in Part I, the U.S. has historically not 
turned to criminal law for curbing corruption, and—furthermore—
international experience shows that indeed criminal law is not meant 
to be the primary tool for corruption control.216 Unfortunately, we do 
not have information about the prosecutions or investigations that 
were abandoned because officials believed that as the law is 
interpreted there would be no chance of convictions. However, we do 
have evidence that indicates that the narrowing of criminal anti-
corruption statutes has not proved to be fatal to the Department of 
Justice’s Public Integrity Section. On the other hand, we have also 
seen major cases—such as Senator Menendez’s outlined in the 
introduction—where prosecutors have lost seemingly because of how 
the Supreme Court has interpreted criminal corruption laws. The next 
part turns to this debate. 
III.  THE EFFECTS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE 
Reading the Court’s anti-corruption jurisprudence may lead one 
to conclude that the Department of Justice must have an impossible 
job prosecuting corruption.217 Whether or not it does, however, is an 
 
 213. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and the Criminal Law, 2 FORUM ON CRIME & SOC’Y 
3, 6 (2002); FISMAN & GOLDEN, supra note 53, at 26–30. 
 214. TEACHOUT, supra note 84, at 50. 
 215. See Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad Definitions of Bribery Make 
Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 484–85 (2015) (making the case that broad 
interpretations of anti-corruption statutes create a risk of too much prosecution). 
 216. See supra Part I. 
 217. This is despite there being a specialized unit, the Public Integrity Section (“PIN”), within 
DOJ handling these cases, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Public Corruption Unit 
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empirical question. One (limited)218 way to assess this is to look at the 
number of cases the DOJ prosecuted and the number of convictions or 
pleas it secures. The DOJ219 publishes yearly reports to Congress 
detailing its activities.220 In its last report (from 2018), the Department 
published a table of cases charged and convicted per year between 
1999 and 2019.221 The table is not perfect because the litigations are 
lengthy, so many (if not most) of the convictions coming in any given 
year are from older cases. For example, in 2018 there were 479 cases 
still awaiting resolution.222 Nonetheless, the table shows a fairly 
impressive conviction rate of around 90.6% in total.223 The yearly 
average conviction rate is similar at 91%.224 And in fact, if anything 
that number has been improving since Skilling was decided. From 
1999 to 2010 the U.S. secured convictions in 88% of the cases tried 
by the Department, and since 2011 it has won in 95% of cases.225 
At the outset it is important to be clear about the kinds of cases 
brought by the DOJ and reported by the PIN. As the Section details in 
its report to Congress, the PIN’s priorities are “election crimes,” 
 
and the Office of the Inspector General, which provide technical and investigative assistance. See 
Landscape Assessment: Survey of the Practitioners, Offices, and Agencies Charged with Upholding 
Public Integrity Across the United States, CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY 
(2016), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/341201645-
landscape-assessment.pdf. I point to this because such specialized institutions in anti-corruption 
law enforcement are rare worldwide. 
 218. Although I engage in this analysis in this part, it is important to recognize its limitations. 
As I mention infra, a problem with this approach is that we do not have a good approximation of 
the real total number of cases investigated because we only have the ones were the DOJ pushed 
forward. In other words, our denominator is limited, and we do not know if the limitation is a 
product of prosecutors abandoning unfruitful investigations or letting go of cases due to political 
or extra-legal pressures. By looking at conviction rates alone, we cannot assess how the Department 
is responding to the narrowing of the anti-corruption laws. Nonetheless it does provide an important 
first approximation. In subsequent projects I intend to tackle the question with a more qualitative 
approach. 
 219. The PIN is the one that publishes the reports; however, these contain prosecutions carried 
out by them and/or U.S. Attorney Offices. See Public Integrity Section (PIN), DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-pin (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 220. Id. 
 221. The following analysis takes only the list between 1999 and 2018 as that was the last year 
available at the time of writing. Since then, one more year has been published. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION 
FOR 2018 23–24 (Apr. 26, 2018). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. This was calculated dividing the total cases charged by total convictions between 1999 
and 2018. It ignores the many cases still pending. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See id. All of these numbers come out of calculating percentages from the 2018 PIN report 
to Congress. Id. 
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“conflict of interest crimes,” and public corruption cases.226 It is this 
latter category that has been most impacted by the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence reviewed in the previous part. The Court’s focus (and 
that of most scholars) has been on the bribery and the honest-services 
statutes, but as the PIN report shows the Government has many more 
tools at its disposal than what we have just discussed.227 It’s important 
to highlight that the Section specializes in more than just the types of 
cases we have discussed so far because it contextualizes any of the 
numbers that the Section reports; a 95% conviction rate does not mean 
that the Department wins 95% of bribery cases, but rather that it wins 
95% of a variety of cases that it broadly categorizes as 
corruption/public trust cases. With that caveat in mind, I now turn to 
look at the numbers. 
The 95% conviction rate suggests that, despite the uproar, the 
DOJ has been undeterred by the Supreme Court anticorruption 
jurisprudence. However, there are a couple of factors  that complicate 
the puzzle. First, since Skilling, the number of prosecutions carried out 
by the DOJ has fallen. The Department prosecuted 13.5% fewer cases 
between 2011 and 2018 than it did between 1999 and 2010.228 This is 
true across all kinds of prosecutions, from federal to private ones.229 
In fact, the ones that have decreased the least are federal ones 
(dropping by 19% in the observed periods).230 An explanation for this 
drop is that it is now harder to prosecute cases because of the way the 
Supreme Court has ruled. Another option is that the DOJ is bringing 
fewer but better cases, which would account for their greater success 
rate. 
Second, an important issue with these statistics is that they 
obscure the relevant denominator, which is not the cases charged, but 
the number of cases that would have been prosecuted but-for a legal 
analysis concluding that under current case law a conviction is not 
possible or likely. In other words, we do not know how many cases 
the Department investigated and dropped because it felt that it would 
not secure a conviction given the current standards. Without this 
 
 226. Id. at ii. 
 227. This is important because it widens the scope of what we consider anti-corruption criminal 
prosecution. 
 228. See id. at 23–24. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See id. 
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number, we do not know how constrained public officials are (or feel) 
by the Court. 
Nonetheless, at a bare minimum, the large number of successful 
prosecutions implies that prosecutors are far from powerless. We may 
not know the “true” rate of conviction, but we do know that in the last 
nineteen years the Department has won convictions in over 19,000 
anti-corruption cases, 7,515 of them occurring after Skilling was 
decided.231 This is not an insignificant success rate. Arguing that the 
Supreme Court really has hampered the Department requires showing 
that but for these decisions the DOJ would have brought thousands of 
cases that it chose not to bring. After all, for the “true” conviction rate 
to drop to 50%, for example, the DOJ would have needed to drop 
around 21,000 cases in nineteen years.232 Given the sheer volume of 
cases, a drop this numerous is highly unlikely.233 
Furthermore, beyond the numbers reported, the actual cases 
described in the Department’s yearly congressional reports suggests 
that the DOJ is not powerless.234 First, the reports show that, like in 
much of the criminal justice system, most of the convictions secured 
by the Department are the result of guilty pleas.235 This shows, at a 
minimum, that defendants in public corruption cases are not persuaded 
that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence shields them from the reach of 
 
 231. See id. 
 232. See id. 
 233.   The numbers presented by the DOJ are not disaggregated by race, gender, socioeconomic 
status, or title/role of the individual being prosecuted. As such, more fine-grained analysis as to the 
actual power dynamics at play between prosecutors and defendants cannot be ascertained. It could 
be that the DOJ chooses mostly “weak” defendants (low ranking officials for example) to secure 
most convictions, which they then do. However, as discussed infra, when they prosecute high-
profile cases their success rate is much lower, reinforcing their use of discretion in favor of easier 
to convict cases. Such a use of discretion is not inconceivable; in fact, it would be consistent with 
how many prosecutors decide which cases to take. Without more data we cannot know for sure. 
This is an area of important future research. Even noting this big caveat, however, I believe that the 
large number of successful prosecutions forces proponents of the position that the Supreme Court 
has weakened the DOJ tremendously to, at a bare minimum, show how this is so beyond the few 
high-profile losses discussed in this article.  
 234. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 221, at 10–20. How much should be read into these 
reports is questionable. After all, these reports are written with a particular audience: congressional 
oversight committees. To that extent, these reports will often paint a self-serving and congratulatory 
picture. Nonetheless, with that caveat in mind, we cannot ignore the fact that the reports showcase 
actual convictions, regardless of the story-telling methods employed in the reports. 
 235. This has been true for a long time. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its 
History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1,1 (1979); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 
857, 857 (2000). 
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the State.236 The other thing that stands out from the reports is that the 
Department has been successful in prosecuting various kinds of public 
officials and private citizens: from former Federal agents,237 to state 
representatives,238 and both non-profit239 and for-profit240 high ranking 
employees or business owners. 
It is not only the report that suggests that the reach of the Court’s 
anti-corruption jurisprudence has not been as impactful as much of the 
commentary outlined in the introduction suggested. Several lower 
courts have upheld convictions even under the shadow cast by 
McDonnell and/or Skilling. For example, in United States v. Lee,241 
the Sixth Circuit looked into whether or not a local public official had 
carried out an “official act” in furtherance of Hobbs Act extortion 
when she helped a private individual who had paid her a lot of 
money242 to “achieve favorable outcomes in judicial and 
administrative proceedings.”243 The defendant in Lee argued that even 
if under McDonnell a “public official did not actually have to perform 
 
 236. Much of the plea-bargaining literature discusses the relative power-asymmetry between 
prosecutors and defense, and the sword of Damocles effect of sentencing post-trial versus in a 
guilty-plea are very influential in securing guilty pleas even in circumstances where individuals are 
not guilty. See Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain, 92 IND. L.J. 901 passim 
(2017). The extent to which this is happening in these types of cases depends on whether the people 
being prosecutors are mostly individuals that have the resources to not be coerced into guilty pleas 
by the fear of potentially high sentences. Nonetheless, my claim is not that individuals fighting 
these cases are always powerful, wealthy, or well-connected, but rather that regardless of who they 
are and how connected they are, the fact that there are still mostly guilty pleas suggests that the 
Supreme Court’s anti-corruption criminal law hasn’t served as a shield to the Department’s sword. 
 237. See, e.g., Information, United States v. King, No. 18-cr-00318 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2018) 
(where a former U.S. Department of Veteran’s affairs pleaded guilty to honest services and property 
wire fraud, bribery, and falsifying records to obstruct an administrative investigation); Information, 
United States v. Sanchez, No. 18-cr-00040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2018) (where a former ICE 
attorney pleaded guilty to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft). 
 238. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 978 F.3d 554, 557, 563 (2020) (where former Arkansas 
State Senator Jonathan Woods was convicted of conspiracy to commit honest services mail and 
wire fraud, honest services mail and wire fraud, and money laundering). 
 239. See, e.g., United States v. Oksuz, No. 18-cr-00088 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019) (where a former 
president of an NGO pled guilty to devising a scheme to falsify, conceal, and cover up material 
facts from the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ethics). 
 240. See, e.g., Verdict Form, United States v. Lundergan, No. 18-CR-00106-GFVT, 2013 WL 
12458169 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 12, 2013); United States v. Lundergan, No. 18-CR-00106-GFVT, 2020 
WL 3895771, at *1 (E.D. Ky. July 10, 2020). 
 241. 919 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 895 (2020). 
 242. In that case, an Ohio County Council member was charged with various counts of honest-
services mail and wire fraud and Hobbs Act extortion after she helped a private citizen (who had 
paid her large amounts of money a number of times) try to secure more favorable outcomes for 
criminal matters involving his family members and also with the IRS. Id. at 342–43. 
 243. Id. at 354. 
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an official act herself,”244 there was a tacit requirement that the person 
carrying out the act have either an “advisory role” or “leverage or 
power” over the second official for her conduct to be an official act in 
furtherance of Hobbs Act extortion.245 The Sixth Circuit disagreed, 
finding that “nowhere in McDonnell did the Supreme Court state that 
it was creating such a rule.”246 
United States v. Lee serves to highlight two propositions. First, 
circuit courts will not go further than McDonnell. What the defense 
was asking was further circumscribing “official act” to only certain 
acts depending on the relationship with certain public officials.247 
There is no need for such specificity in a criminal statute, and the court 
quickly saw through this argument and dismissed it.248 Secondly, and 
more significantly perhaps, this case shows that even under 
McDonnell convictions are possible.249 The Sixth Circuit concluded 
that there was enough evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to 
“conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant agreed to 
perform [an official act] in exchange for bribes.”250 Crucially, for a 
conviction, the Government did not need to prove that official acts, 
advice, or pressure were taken—but simply that there was an 
agreement that they would be.251 On first blush it seems that this is a 
distinction without a difference, but it is not. By allowing prosecutions 
to be centered around agreements rather than only affirmative acts, the 
Sixth Circuit is giving the Department a wider prosecution net. This 
decision obviously does not carry the force of the Supreme Court 
precedent, but it does offer a path for future prosecutions to craft 
 
 244. Id. at 351. 
 245. Id. at 352. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 359. It may be argued that Lee only shows that low-level public officials will be 
successfully prosecuted. The defendant in that case was only a local council member in Ohio, after 
all. Id. at 343. Meanwhile, as discussed infra high-ranking officials have been protected thanks to 
McDonnell and other cases. It may be that the relative position of the officials is affecting the 
outcomes of the cases; however, the issue is whether the Supreme Court is devising rules that make 
it impossible to prosecute certain cases. Lee suggests that it is not. Perhaps more needs to be done 
when a particular kind of defendant is facing prosecution, but that need not necessarily be 
expanding the law to more conduct. After all, that could only lead to even more low-level 
prosecutions as opposed to high-level ones. See note 190 and accompanying text. 
 250. Lee, 919 F.3d at 356. 
 251. Id. at 350. 
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successful case strategies even under the McDonnell construction of 
bribery. 
In another important recent decision, United States v. Ng Lap 
Seng,252 the Second Circuit refused to extend the definition of “official 
act” from 18 U.S.C. § 201 (at issue in McDonnell) to 18 U.S.C. § 666, 
a bribery and embezzlement statute, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (FCPA).253 The case involved a Chinese real estate developer, Ng, 
who bribed two U.N. officials so the U.N would host a convention in 
one of his hotels in Macau.254 Sections 666 and 201 are worded 
differently but proscribe the same conduct: bribing a public official 
with the intent to influence a public decision, soliciting bribes for the 
same thing (or attempting either).255 Both of the statutes therefore 
address explicit quid pro quos, nothing more. The Second Circuit 
found that the statutes differed in that McDonnell’s “official act” 
standard for the quo component of bribery as proscribed by section 
201 does not apply to the “more expansive” language of section 666 
or the FCPA.256 
This ruling shows that the Department of Justice is not as 
constrained by McDonnell like many claim it is. After all, it could 
simply choose to charge a different crime to avoid the pitfalls it ran 
into in McDonnell. In fact, Ng Lap Seng suggests that, had the 
Department retried Governor McDonnell charging a violation of 
section 666, it could have won. Remember that at issue in McDonnell 
were payments and gifts upwards of $170,000 from a private actor to 
secure lucrative government contracts for his companies.257 This 
conduct would have clearly been proscribed by section 666, which 
prohibits “accept[ing] . . . anything of value . . . intending to be 
influenced or rewarded in connection with any . . . transactions of 
such . . . government.”258 The problem for the Supreme Court was that 
McDonnell never did anything more than calling subordinates to 
arrange meetings, which is not an “official act.”259 However, calling 
 
 252. United States v. Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 253. Id. at 146. 
 254. Id. at 116–17. 
 255. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), with 18 U.S.C. § 666(a). 
 256. Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d at 133. They also differ in that the maximum penalty for violating 
section 201 is a fifteen-year prison sentence and for section 666 is ten years. Compare 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666(a), with 18 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
 257. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361 (2016). 
 258. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). 
 259. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373–74. 
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subordinates to arrange meetings—with all the other factual evidence 
in that case—could be a violation of section 666. 
Carrying out a similar analysis as the Second Circuit in Ng Lap 
Seng, other lower court260 cases have sustained prosecutions after an 
analysis of Skilling261 and Sun-Diamond,262 two cases that have been 
oft-criticized as harbingers of rampant corruption.263 My aim here is 
not to highlight every single case that has gone favorably for the 
Government.264 Rather, I point to these cases to suggest that courts 
have found limiting principles and/or prosecutors have deftly argued 
that criminal elements are met even under the Supreme Court’s 
constraining jurisprudence. That is, for all the harbingers of impunity 
announced, there are still a number of examples of law enforcement 
securing convictions for crimes of corruption. 
On the other hand, to point to these cases and the above-
mentioned DOJ reports as proof that the Department is unaffected by 
the Supreme Court anticorruption jurisprudence is to ignore the many 
 
 260. There have been more courts sustaining convictions under McDonnell. See, e.g., United 
States v. Oaks, 302 F. Supp. 3d 716, 728 (D. Md. 2018) (finding that the “allegations [were] within 
the range of conduct proscribed by federal law after McDonnell”). 
 261. See, e.g., United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1322–23 n.9 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(sustaining a conviction for honest services mail and wire fraud) (“Here, however, in sharp contrast, 
there is no doubt that the government charged Langford with accepting bribes as a public official—
classic honest services fraud that existed before, and after, Skilling.”). 
 262. See, e.g., United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (where the 
Eleventh Circuit followed a similar analysis as the second in Lang, distinguishing section 201 and 
section 666 to sustain a conviction against private contractors for bribery after it had been 
challenged on grounds that Sun-Diamond precluded only actions in connection to an official act); 
see also United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 146 (2d Cir. 2007) (sustaining corruption 
convictions by refusing to extend the interpretation of section 201 in Sun-Diamond to “neither the 
Hobbs Act provision under which Ganim was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, nor any other of the 
bribery-related statutes at issue”). 
 263. See, e.g., Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 21, at 496; Eisler, supra note 50, at 1636. This is in 
keeping with many holdings by U.S. courts that have been more pro-government in these types of 
cases than the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 392–94 (2d. Cir. 
1999) (a case abrogated on other grounds where the Second Circuit analyzed Hobbs Act extortion—
18 U.S.C. § 1951—and recognized that the term “property,” as opposed to “anything of value” 
found elsewhere in the statute, is “expansive,” encompassing “in a broad sense, any valuable right 
considered as a source or element of wealth, including a right to solicit business”); see also United 
States v. Re, 401 F.3d 828, 834–35 (7th Cir. 2005) (broadly interpreting the extent to which 
interstate commerce needs to be affected for the Hobbs Act to apply, finding that the Government 
need only demonstrate a de minimis effect on commerce); United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 
851–52 (7th Cir. 2001) (there need only be a “realistic probability of an effect . . . on interstate 
commerce” for Hobbs Act extortion). 
 264. Not only would that be an endless task, but also lower courts have equally used McDonnell 
and other cases to find for defendants. See United States v. Jefferson, 289 F. Supp. 3d 717, 736 
(E.D. Va. 2017) (reversing a conviction on the grounds that “[t]he evidence presented at trial d[id] 
not support a finding that Jefferson (the defendant) took ‘official acts’”). 
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high-profile cases, like the one of Senator Menendez, that suggest 
otherwise. In the past decade, besides Kelly, McDonnell, and the failed 
prosecution of Senator Menendez, there have been at least two other 
major cases that have been directly affected by the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
In 2017, a district judge vacated seven of ten corruption charges 
against former congressman William Jefferson, who had been 
convicted of using his congressional office as a criminal enterprise to 
enrich himself, soliciting and accepting hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in bribes to support his business ventures in Africa.265 The 
court found that much of the behavior at issue did not rise to the 
“official act” standard articulated in McDonnell.266 Then, following a 
similar trajectory, the Second Circuit overturned corruption 
convictions against former New York State Assembly Speaker 
Sheldon Silver.267 The court, again citing the “official acts” standard 
in McDonnell, found that the Government had not proved with enough 
specificity that Mr. Silver had taken or intended to take any acts in 
return for a bribe.268 Note, however, that even in those two cases, the 
Government was able to secure convictions for some of the charges in 
the indictment, even if they failed on their bribery theories.269 
 
 265. Id. at 721, 744. The case involved a scheme to use his office to pressure the U.S. Trade 
and Development Agency to fund a project in Nigeria in exchange for bribes. Id. at 741. It also 
involved numerous other efforts to bribe African officials for various business ventures there. Id. 
at 721–22. In a famous aspect of the case, $90,000 dollars were found in Mr. Jefferson’s freezer 
for bribes in Nigeria. Id. at 723–24. 
 266. Id. at 740. 
 267. United States v. Silver, 948 F.3d 538, 546, 577 (2d Cir. 2020) (stating that the Government 
accused Silver of having “orchestrated two separate bribery schemes in which he received referral 
fees from law firms in exchange for taking official actions”). The Second Circuit did not overturn 
all of the convictions, only the ones relating to Hobbs Act extortion. Id. at 577. 
 268. Id. at 574–75. 
 269. Jefferson, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 755; Silver, 948 F.3d at 577. Although there is lack of clarity 
around the term, many have pointed out the problematic nature of “over-charging” defendants in 
criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and 
Discretion in the Charging Function, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1259 passim (2011) (discussing a proposed 
ABA Criminal Justice Standard for charging practices to see whether it removes much of the 
problematic discretion in charging practices); see also Rudolph J. Gerber, A System in Collapse: 
Appearance vs. Reality in Criminal Justice, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 225, 226 (1993) (taking 
overcharging as fact and arguing that for sophisticated defense attorneys and defendants, this 
culture of overcharging means that the charges don’t really mean what they say but merely 
constitute a first bargaining position: “Experienced defense counsel recognize bargaining as a poker 
game of bluff and intimidation.”). One could read my analysis to suggest that I am tacitly arguing 
that in these cases perhaps the Government ought to over-charge so that something sticks. That 
however need not be the reading. The Government should only charge bribery if it thinks it can 
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Nevertheless, the fact remains that, in a number of high-profile 
cases, the Department of Justice has lost. Making matters worse for 
the Government is that the impact on anti-corruption efforts of losing 
those cases is arguably greater than that of winning all the other 
smaller ones. This is because, in issues of corruption, “the fish rots 
from the head down.”270 According to the political scientist Bo 
Rothstein, because of their visibility, high-ranking public officials 
getting away with corruption can be hugely detrimental to anti-
corruption efforts, because they cement perceptions that corruption is 
happening, thereby spreading corruption.271 Therefore, the fact that a 
number of political scandals—“Bridgegate” and Governor 
McDonnell’s and Senator Menendez’s clear acts of malfeasance—are 
met with impunity can undo many of the Department of Justice’s anti-
corruption litigation achievements. 
The question is, therefore, are the losses enough to make us 
worried? On the one hand, it is true that the DOJ has suffered a number 
of high-profile and impactful losses; however, it is also true that its 
own conviction rate and the outcomes in several district courts suggest 
that the Federal Government still has mechanisms to successfully 
prosecute these cases. Unfortunately, whether the impunity is enough 
to create high levels of corruption from becoming the norm is an 
admittedly empirical question that we do not currently have tools to 
answer. 
Determining the necessity for criminal law reform will thus 
necessarily be normative. In the next part, I argue that the focus for 
reform in anticorruption should not be the criminal law.272 This part 
has shown that prosecutions in this area are difficult, but not 
 
win, but just because it may not be able to win under section 201 does not mean it cannot win under 
section 666 and should therefore charge that crime. 
 270. Bo Rothstein, Corruption and Social Trust: Why the Fish Rots from the Head Down, 80 
SOC. RSCH.: INT’L Q. 1009, 1009 (2013). 
 271. Id. at 1021–22. According to the standard equilibrium model of how corruption works, 
perceptions of corruption have the power of increasing or decreasing corruption because people 
engage in the behavior according to how frequent they believe that behavior to be. Id. This is why 
high-visibility impunity is so problematic. See Pedro Gerson, Return of the King: Corruption 
Backsliding in America, CARDOZO 3 INT’L COMPAR., POL’Y & ETHICS L. REV. 985, 1045–46 
(2020). 
 272. I will not engage with all the possible normative analyses for this question. We could 
engage in a very lengthy discussion of what is necessary to achieve justice from a retributivist 
standpoint or a restorative justice standpoint. Those questions, however, are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
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impossible.273 The fact that winning is complicated, however, is in line 
not only with the many procedural protections of criminal law but also 
does not alter the basic framework of the purpose of criminal law in 
anti-corruption efforts. Experts agree that the way to foster good, 
impartial, and non-corrupt governance is not through criminal law that 
punishes corrupt acts, but through institutions that prevent them.274 
It is undeniable that the more recent high visibility losses are not 
occurring in a vacuum. We have seen how various violations of 
governance and constitutional norms from the executive have gone 
unpunished.275 In this context, some may believe it is necessary to 
reform criminal laws. However, as many criminal law scholars have 
argued for other types of conduct, the fact that we have a problem does 
not mean that criminalizing it more is a solution.276 That is an 
argument usually reserved to protect vulnerable, not powerful, 
members of society from the reach of criminal law. However, this is 
not about protecting the powerful but recognizing that the criminal 
law, albeit imperfectly, is already serving its intended purpose, and 
that demanding it do more may become too costly. This is not only 
because the efficient level of impunity is not zero,277 but also because 
 
 273. This is the reality of criminal anti-corruption prosecutions all around the world. See 
Gerson, supra note 271, at 1031–32. Winning those cases is notoriously difficult because most 
defendants are typically well-connected and sophisticated, and information is hard to come by; after 
all we are talking about prosecuting high-ranking public officials and/or well-resourced private 
actors. These cases tend to drag on and, as explained through this Article, will often be narrowly 
decided. A final case to discuss that shows this point is that of Norman Seabrook, the former leader 
of New York City’s correction officers union. United States v. Seabrook, 467 F. Supp. 3d 171, 172 
(S.D.N.Y. 2020). In 2018 a judge declared a mistrial after a jury had not been able to decide whether 
to convict Mr. Seabrook for allegedly establishing a kickback scheme where he received $60,000 
for channeling union money to a hedge fund. Id. at 171–72. The following year, federal prosecutors 
were able to convince a jury that Mr. Seabrook was guilty of honest services wire fraud. Id. at 175 
n.3. Mr. Seabrook subsequently appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting certain 
evidence, made statements in open court that constituted “plain error,” and “abused its discretion 
in denying his motion for a new trial.” United States v. Seabrook, 814 F. App’x 661, 662–63 (2d 
Cir. 2020). The Second Circuit rejected Mr. Seabrook’s evidentiary arguments and affirmed the 
lower court’s decision. Id. at 662–64. 
 274. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 68, at 3; FISMAN & GOLDEN, supra note 53, at 3; 
TEACHOUT, supra 84, at 27 (arguing that much of the constitutional structure of checks and 
balances, as well as rules promoting transparency and oversight, were explicitly created as a way 
to prevent corruption). 
 275. See Gerson, supra note 271, at 994–95 (arguing that repeated norms violations from the 
executive, repeated acts of impunity for criminal corruption, and free-wheeling campaign finance 
create the risk of corruption increasing in the U.S.). 
 276. See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3 
(2008). 
 277. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 191 (1968). 
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it will be difficult to draft more stringent laws that do not create a 
chilling effect on socially valuable conduct. In the following part, I 
start with a brief discussion of the problems with reforming criminal 
laws, and then I outline what I believe should be the focus for anti-
corruption efforts in the U.S. 
IV.  ENFORCING ANTI-CORRUPTION BEYOND CRIMINAL LAW: A WAY 
FORWARD 
There have been various proposals to attend to the problem of 
corruption in the United States. Most recently, for example, Senator 
Elizabeth Warren introduced the Public Integrity Act.278 This 
proposal, notably, has very little to say on changes to criminal law.279 
Most of the measures in the bill have more to do with recognizing that 
corruption is about integrity in government generally, which is more 
than the crimes of bribery, embezzlement, and conflict of interest.280 
As a result, the bill seeks to constrain the relationships between public 
officials and private actors,281 lobbyists in particular; establish 
administrative procedures that adequately block corporate 
involvement in rulemaking;282 increase transparency of public 
officials;283 and reduce the potential for conflicts of interest to affect 
public policymaking.284 In terms of the criminal law, Senator Warren 
has proposed a package that reforms the institutions prosecuting 
corruption crimes by creating an independent U.S. Office of Public 
Integrity that will be better protected from political interference and 
be more equipped (both in resources and know-how) to prosecute 
corruption cases.285 Notably, the bill does not focus very much on 
changing criminal law, only broadening the definition of bribery in 18 
U.S.C. § 201(a), and clearly prohibiting undisclosed self-dealing by 
public officials in 18 U.S.C. § 1346.286 In this part I argue that this is 
 
 278. Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Senator, U.S. Senate, Warren and Jayapal Reintroduce 
the Anti-Corruption & Public Integrity Act (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.warren.senate.gov 
/newsroom/press-releases/warren-and-jayapal-reintroduce-the-anti-corruption-and-public-
integrity-act. 
 279. See Anti-Corruption and Public Integrity Act, S. 5070, 116th Cong. (2020). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at § 102. 
 282. Id. at § 309. 
 283. Id. at § 131. 
 284. Id. at § 301. 
 285. Id. at § 511. 
 286. Id. at §§ 121–122.  
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the correct approach to take because it is not clear that broader anti-
corruption criminal laws will be effective in overcoming the Supreme 
Court’s anticorruption jurisprudence while at the same time carrying 
a risk of criminalizing socially beneficial conduct. I then propose that, 
beyond the measures sought by Senator Warren, there are other tools 
that could be implemented that could achieve better accountability 
without the risks of over-criminalization. 
Throughout this Article, I have discussed three groups of statutes 
in particular: the bribery statute (18 U.S.C. § 201 (a) and (b)), the 
honest services statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346), and the 
theft or bribery of federal programs (18 U.S.C. § 666). As mentioned 
in the introduction, there is a broader range of conduct that is 
penalized, going from false statements and perjury to violations of the 
Travel Act that could be considered anti-corruption tools, depending 
on the context. However, following Kevin Davis’s definition of 
corruption,287 when discussing anti-corruption criminal law reform, I 
am referring to the three groups of statutes just mentioned. 
A good way to think about how these statutes could be reformed 
is to think backwards from the losses at the Supreme Court discussed 
supra in Part II.288 From those cases we see that the highest barriers 
for successful prosecutions are the bribery and honest services statutes 
(incidentally, both were charged in Senator Menendez’s indictment). 
To recap, the limiting constraint as regards to section 201, articulated 
in McDonnell, is that the acts carried out by officials need to be 
 
 287. Davis, supra note 54, at 1290 n.5. 
 288. In 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Public Corruption Prosecution 
Improvements Act that would do just that. See Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, 
S. 401, 112th Cong. (2011). Alongside substantive changes to the bribery, gratuity, and mail and 
wire fraud statutes, the bill included a number of procedural measures to aid prosecutors. Id. As 
discussed infra, I do not object in principle to any of these—mainly procedural—changes. Because 
the bill is now almost ten years old it is somewhat dated. Notably, its expansion of the definition of 
“official act” would not have been enough to overcome the constraining analysis in McDonnell. 
Furthermore, its reform of the mail and wire fraud is problematic constitutionally and arguably does 
not actually affect the Supreme Court’s ruling in Skilling. This proposal focuses on expanding fraud 
to “anything of value,” from money or property. However, post McNally, Congress enacted section 
1346 to widen the scope of what is considered a mail or wire fraud to include theft of honest 
services. Skilling agreed with that but interpreted the statute as saying that honest services violations 
exist only when there is a kickback scheme; that is, section 1346 does not criminalize undisclosed 
self-dealing or nondisclosure of financial interest. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 409–10 
(2010). Senator Leahy’s proposal does not address this holding. It simply expands the kickback 
scheme to incorporate more than money, but it does not do more to criminalize undisclosed self-
dealing. 
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“official acts.”289 The limiting constraint for the honest-services 
statute is, as articulated in Skilling, that the an individual can only be 
prosecuted for honest-services theft when there is a “bribery or 
kickback scheme.”290 This implies that there needs to be a quid pro 
quo (or an agreement thereof) but not necessarily that the quo involves 
an “official act” to successfully prosecute an honest services case.291 
Substantive anti-corruption criminal law reform, therefore, will 
likely focus on addressing the constraints the Court articulated in these 
two sets of statutes. For bribery, Congress could enact a law that would 
expand the meaning of “official act” (or do away with it entirely as it 
has in section 666). This change would mean that a quo under U.S. 
law could be more than something a pending or to-be-brought 
“question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.”292 
Meanwhile, amending the mail and wire fraud statutes would be 
focused on criminalizing undisclosed self-dealing or nondisclosure of 
financial interest. 
At first blush, both of these reforms seem necessary and 
commendable. After all, they would allow the DOJ to successfully 
prosecute cases like McDonnell or the one against Senator Menendez. 
However, the problem with either of these measures is not that they 
help capture bad acts, but that their net is far too wide. The constraints 
currently articulated in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence may lead 
to failed corruption prosecutions, but these measures have the risk of 
criminalizing conduct that is a natural by-product of the U.S. political 
process.293 
 
 289. The Supreme Court in McDonnell identified a two-part test for an official act: “[f]irst, the 
Government must identify a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ that ‘may at 
any time be pending’ or may by law be brought before a public official. Second, the Government 
must prove that the public official made a decision or took an action ‘on’ that question, matter, 
cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, or agreed to do so.” McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2355, 2368 (2016). 
 290. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 407–08. 
 291. See Ng Lap Seng, discussed supra Section II, where the Second Circuit held that section 
666 did not include the stronger “official act” standard that section 201 does. 934 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 
2019). Likewise, because sections 1341 and 1343 do not mention official acts, courts will likely 
not read the “official act” language into them. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2018). This is 
notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court read a bribery and kickback scheme into the statute. 
After all, that reading was substantiated by a long history of how the statute was interpreted. See 
Skilling, 561 U.S. at 409–10. That same history does not support the added “official act” hurdle. 
 292. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 293. Some may object to this qualification, because what is criminal should be criminal 
regardless of political realities. Bribery, after all, is male in se, arguably. However, given the 
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I am not only referring to campaign finance,294 but rather to the 
fact that the U.S. political system fosters and promotes interaction 
between constituents and public officials. How government officials 
behave is in fact very much dependent on these interactions. The 
substantive criminal law reforms as articulated could mean that any 
responses to constituent demands could be criminalized. If, for 
example, a popular and influential anti-carceral nonprofit were to 
sponsor a trip to Germany and Norway with the intent to persuade a 
state official to push for bail reform legislation, and the local official 
knew the purpose and accepted the trip, then that could be interpreted 
as a quid pro quo. The trip could be, of course, a way to show the 
official how other countries address the pre-trial detention, but a 
broader statute would allow that exchange to be prosecuted. Of course, 
a prosecution like this is unlikely to happen; however, the criminal law 
should not be built upon the notion that prosecutors will always act in 
the public interest.295 
Another way to say this is that we must understand statutes in 
context. In a world where money is part and parcel of the political 
process, broad criminal laws will include conduct that is not meant to 
be criminalized. The issue is that a quid pro quo is, to a certain degree, 
in the eye of the beholder. To understand whether an action is an abuse 
of power for personal gain, one needs a lot of contextual information. 
Unfortunately, this makes it hard to create abstract and definite 
 
distance between criminal law in practice and criminal law in theory, one should not discuss laws 
operating in a vacuum. Furthermore, as I suggest infra it is normatively preferable to address this 
problem by changing the operation of politics rather than criminalizing conduct that is somewhat 
inevitable in this system. Daniel Richman has discussed how politics has always been an integral 
part of law enforcement. See Daniel Richman, Partisan Politics and Federal Law Enforcement: 
The Promise and Corruption of Reconstruction, LAWFARE (July 22, 2019, 3:22 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/partisan-politics-and-federal-law-enforcement-promise-and-
corruption-reconstruction. 
 294. As the Seventh Circuit articulated, “[t]o hold illegal an [official action] furthering the 
interests of some constituents shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and 
received ‘would open to prosecution not only conduct that has long been thought to be well within 
the law but also conduct that in a very real sense is unavoidable . . . .’” Empress Casino Joliet Corp. 
v. Johnston, 763 F.3d 723, 731 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 
272 (1991)). 
 295. Much of the recent literature in criminal law has shown the extent to which prosecutors in 
fact misuse prosecutorial discretion. See EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO 
TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2019); MARIE 
GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
(2016); Mona Lynch, Regressive Prosecutors: Law and Order Politics and Practices in Trump’s 
DOJ, 1 HASTINGS J. CRIME & PUNISHMENT 195, 195 (2020) (arguing that the DOJ in the Trump 
administration has been an active force against criminal justice reform). 
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criminal laws that will not be over-inclusive. Simply put, corruption 
is a standard,296 but criminal law requires rules.297 The reality, as 
acknowledged by Senator Warren’s proposal, is that problems of 
corruption are better addressed at the front-end.298 The solution is 
therefore better to address the relationship between private funding 
and politics rather than reforming criminal law. 
This need not mean that there is no role for criminal law reform 
whatsoever. In the Public Corruption Prosecution Act,299 there are 
several mainly procedural300 reforms that would aid prosecutors in 
pursuing crimes of corruption but that do not carry many of the risks 
that I have just outlined. For example, increasing the statute of 
limitations, lowering the financial threshold amounts for pursuing 
section 666 cases, changes in venue requirements to make it easier to 
prosecute these cases in any forum, and harsher sentences for these 
crimes. All of these amendments could strengthen the DOJ, but they 
do not involve expanding the scope of conduct that can be criminalized 
 
 296. And when the Court has gotten standards it has asked “Congress . . . to speak more 
clearly.” McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987). 
 297. Whether it is beneficial to draft a law as a rule or a standard will depend greatly on what 
kind of law it is and what the normative values and doctrinal principles guiding the proposal are. 
For criminal law, where issues of notice are paramount, and generally we are concerned with 
conduct that is frequent, it is worthwhile to bear the ex ante cost of drafting clear rules at the outset. 
See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 passim 
(1992) (arguing that rules are preferable when the conduct at issue is frequent and when you want 
actors to know what the parameters of legal conduct are). While it is true that most times laws 
operate in between rules and standards, I am assuming that a binary is possible. See John O. 
McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1027 (2014) (“[I]n the real 
world, rules and standards rarely exist as perfect Platonic forms.”). 
 298. As mentioned supra, most anti-corruption scholars believe that in terms of policy, 
anticorruption is best achieved through institutional and prophylactic measures, not through 
broader criminalization of politics. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 299. Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, S. 401, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 300. We should not understand procedural reforms as worthwhile and substantive ones as not. 
There have been procedural proposals that could be in fact quite detrimental. See Eisler, supra note 
50, at 1666. Jacob Eisler has argued that anti-corruption criminal statutes should be broadly 
interpreted to “encourage public-mindedness in government behavior.” Eisler argues that this 
jurisprudential shift would need to be “delica[te] and circumscri[bed],” but that this could be 
achieved through civic conceptions of governance from the Court. Id. at 1667. However, given the 
already balkanized state of criminal law, proposals such as these are terribly fraught. Furthermore, 
international examples of countries adjusting criminal procedure for anti-corruption criminal 
statutes, like Brazil, have failed spectacularly. See O’Sullivan, supra note 63, at 643, 655 (arguing 
that the federal penal code is such “a national disgrace,” with it’s various “vague, overbroad, or 
internally inconsistent laws” that it is actually impossible to efficiently and fairly administer 
criminal laws); see also Prado & Machado, supra note 64 (showing that Brazil is currently 
experiencing a drop in confidence on the rule of law which can be arguably traced back to bending 
criminal laws to forge ahead with criminal prosecutions). 
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in such a way that carries a risk of criminalizing behavior that is part 
and parcel of the U.S.301 political process. 
A more complicated set of reforms could be to improve and 
increase the mechanisms by which public officials can face 
administrative consequences for acts of corruption. There is already a 
robust institutional infrastructure that seeks to safeguard institutional 
accountability and non-corrupt governance across the Federal 
Government. The executive branch has offices like the General 
Accountability Office,302 the Office of Government Ethics and the 
Federal Inspectors General.303 The Legislature has the Senate Select 
and the House Committees on Ethics as well as the Office of 
Congressional Ethics, which can investigate and/or recommend 
administrative actions for violations of conduct codes or laws.304 
Finally, the judiciary has the circuit-level judicial councils, which 
investigate complaints against federal judges, and the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts, which focuses on financial 
disclosure guidelines.305 However, all of these institutions are seldom 
leveraged to act forcefully against acts of corruption. 
The case of Senator Menendez is instructive. After the 
prosecution decided to drop the charges against Mr. Menendez, the 
Senate Ethics Committee looked at all the evidence gathered by the 
Department of Justice.306 The Committee found that there was clear 
evidence that Sen. Menendez had accepted numerous gifts and acted 
in favor of Mr. Melgen, who had given him those gifts, in violation of 
 
 301. I make an emphasis on the U.S. because its system fosters a particular closeness between 
private and public actors. 
 302. The GAO carries out a number of cost-benefit analyses that necessarily lead to looking at 
whether any government program is being defrauded or there are signs of embezzlement. What 
GAO Does, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 303. See Landscape Assessment: Survey of the Practitioners, Offices, and Agencies Charged 
with Upholding Public Integrity Across the United States, supra note 217 (discussing government 
oversight agencies including the Office of Government Ethics and federal inspectors general). 
 304. About Us, U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, https://www.ethics.senate.gov/public 
/index.cfm/aboutus (last visited April 11, 2021); About, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. 
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“Senate Rules, federal law, and applicable standards of conduct.”307 
However, in the end, that resulted in only an obligation of repaying 
Mr. Melgen for the gifts and in a “severe admoni[tion].”308 Senator 
Menendez was not even fined (he only had to reimburse the gifts), nor 
was he punished for clear and significant errors in his financial 
disclosure reports.309 
If “accountability refers specifically to the requirement that 
offenders ‘make amends’ for their crimes by repaying or restoring 
losses to victims and the community,”310 then the letter of admonition 
seems like a far cry from accountability to evidently corrupt conduct. 
After all, Senator Menendez did not apologize for his conduct, nor did 
he seek a way to repair the damage he had done to the Senate. In fact, 
even after an official finding of wrongdoing, Senator Menendez 
refused to admit that he had done anything other than accounting 
errors in disclosure reports.311 
The United States could follow the example of other countries 
and push for non-criminal measures to ensure true accountability.312 
Both France and Mexico, for example, have created anti-corruption 
independent agencies or systems (conformed of numerous agencies) 
tasked with proposing new regulations for corruption control.313 
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Furthermore, they have given these institutions the power to impose 
non-criminal penalties for acts of corruption.314 In Mexico 
specifically, administrative liability can result in a prohibition on 
holding public or administrative office for any given number of 
years.315 The United States could similarly increase the ability of its 
many institutions to fashion sanctions against public officials for 
violations of ethical conduct.316 
Evidently, what kinds of sanctions would be permissible is a 
complicated question that merits further study. This is true of every 
country. In fact, in both France and Mexico, the anti-corruption 
agencies are tasked with studying what is allowed constitutionally and 
continually proposing amendments to improve anti-corruption 
efforts.317 However, the point is that rather than focusing on criminal 
law, we should take advantage of the already robust institutional 
infrastructure to develop non-criminal mechanisms to ensure 
accountability.318 There is quite a range of possibilities, from allowing 
and pushing for civil suits against public officials when there is no 
criminal liability, to allowing ethics committees and other bodies to 
 
 314. Id.; French Anti-Corruption Agency Publishes Information Expected from Companies 
During Agency Inspections, supra note 313; Eric Lasry et al., Anti-Corruption in France, GLOB. 
COMPLIANCE NEWS, https://globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/handbook/anti-corruption 
-in-france/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 315. Levine et al., supra note 313. 
 316. One particularly interesting idea is that in Mexico they have created administrative liability 
for conduct typified as a crime of corruption. The federal law regulating administrative sanctions 
has a chapter for bribery defining bribery as it is in the criminal code. Same for embezzlement, and 
undeclared conflict of interest, etc. Crucially, the same prosecutors can charge you in both criminal 
and administrative courts for the same conduct, allowing there to be a greater chance of a sanction. 
This is particularly useful because administrative liability, like civil liability, is not subject to the 
same procedural protections as criminal law (for example, the Government need only show liability 
by a preponderance of the evidence). This means that prosecutors have a greater chance of winning 
these administrative cases than the criminal ones. The administrative sanctions can be onerous: 
they can range from a public admonition to a prohibition on holding office for twenty years. See 
Ley General de Responsabilidades Administrativas [LGRA] arts. 51–63Bis, 78, Diario Oficial de 
la Federación [DOF] 18-07-2016, últimas reformas DOF 13-04-2020 (Mex.). 
 317. Levine et al., supra note 313; French Anti-Corruption Agency Publishes Information 
Expected from Companies During Agency Inspections, supra note 313; Lasry et al., supra note 314. 
 318. This would also allow for the development of jurisprudence incorporating traditional 
fiduciary duties as a way to create a “criterion of legitimacy” by ensuring that “state action . . . 
always be interpretable as action taken in the name of or on behalf of every agent subject to the 
state’s power.” See EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW 
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 3, 99 (2016); see also D. Theodore Rave, 
Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 passim (2013) (arguing that political 
representatives should be subject to a duty of loyalty). 
(6) 54.4_GERSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/21  8:16 PM 
2021] CROOKED POLITICIANS 1065 
impose fines and potentially preclude people from holding public 
office. 
My goal at this moment is not precisely to suggest what laws need 
to be enacted, but rather to outline a general path forward that 
emphasizes that the control of corruption need not be penal. I have 
argued that there are two paths for institutional innovation. One, found 
in Senator Warren’s anti-corruption proposal, described supra, is 
concerned with ex-ante arrangements that decrease the space for 
corruption to occur.319 This is vital. The second is the creation of non-
criminal (but still punitive) ex-post mechanisms that allow for public 
actors who engage in acts of corruption to face consequences. These 
ex-post mechanisms can be seen as complements to criminal law. 
Enacting these measures satisfies the need for sanctions when there 
are acts of wrongdoing that do not rise to the level of crimes, while not 
carrying the risk of enacting overly broad criminal laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Regulating corruption is an extremely complicated endeavor in a 
system where private influences structure the very operation of 
politics. Reformers can look to criminal law as a way to combat this 
influence, but at bottom, it would only be sewing a patch on a much 
larger problem. Furthermore, this measure, as I have argued, could 
endanger individuals who have not engaged in wrongdoing but simply 
operated within the system. 
A systemic approach to corruption control is more in line with 
what the institutional design of the United States was at the time of the 
founding. As Zephyr Teachout writes, “[a]n act was corrupt when 
private power was used to influence public power for private ends. A 
system was corrupt when the public power was excessively used to 
serve private ends instead of the public good. A person was corrupt 
when they use public power for private ends.”320 
Criminal law is necessary to ensure that those corrupt acts and 
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